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ADMISSIBILITY OF CONFESSIONS OBTAINED




Although the general rule of evidence holds extrajudicial con-
fessions admissible at a criminal trial,1 there remain four exclu-
sionary rules barring from evidence out of court confessions 2 or
inculpatory statements obtained under certain circumstances. The
first exclusionary rule governs confessions which, as products of
police inducement or coercion,3 do not meet the evidentiary require-
ment of voluntariness. 4 Because coerced confessions represent a
1. Since an out of court criminal confession is considered a variety
of admission by a party-opponent, it is not barred by the hearsay rule and
therefore may be used as substantive evidence against the defendant-
declarant. See 4 J. WIGMORE, WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 1048 (Chadbourn
rev. 1970).
2. For the purposes of this Comment the term "confession" will be
inclusive of and interchangeable with extrajudicial statements by a criminal
defendant which are self-incriminatory to any degree. Thus, both an open
declaration of guilt and an admission which tends to establish guilt will be
considered species of confession. As observed by the court in Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966): "No distinction can be drawn between state-
ments which are direct confessions and statements which amount to 'admis-
sions' of part or all of the offense." Id. at 476. However, it should be noted
that some jurisdictions apply different standards of admissibility to state-
ments, because they are less than substantial acknowledgments of guilt, and
are not considered confessions. See generally Note, Developments in the
Law-Conessions, 79 HARV. L. REV. 935, 1030-36 (1966).
3. Coercive interrogation tactics condemned by the Supreme Court
include not only "third degree" and "rubber hose" methods, but duress of
a psychological nature as well. In Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199
(1960) the Court stated: "[C]oercion can be mental as well as physical,
and that the blood of the accused is not the only hallmark of unconstitu-
tional inquisition." Id. at 206.
4. Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 602 (1961); Rogers v. Rich-
mond, 365 U.S. 534, 540 (1961). At common law a confession could be ex-
cluded from testimony if it were apparent that it had been induced in some
manner and therefore falsely made. Under this traditional approach, the
courts were concerned not with ensuring the legal rights of the interrogated
party, but rather with guaranteeing the evidentiary reliability and trust-
worthiness of the confession itself. 3 J. WIGMORE, WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE §
822 (Chadbourn rev. 1970). In contrast, contemporary decisions have based
their determination of admissibility upon whether the accused had exercised
free choice in making a confession rather than upon the statement's appar-
ent trustworthiness. See, e.g., Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 208
(1960); United States v. Mitchell, 322 U.S. 65, 68 (1944). Thus, the goal
violation of the fourteenth amendment guarantee of due processt
and the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination, 6 such
confessions are inadmissible in both federal and state criminal pro-
ceedings. The second type of exclusionary rule deals with confes-
sions elicited subsequent to an unreasonable search and seizure pro-
hibited by the fourth amendment. 7 Though confessions are not per
se within the explicit protection of the fourth amendment, once
a confession is found by a court to be the immediate consequence
or "fruit" of an illegal search or seizure, it will be excluded from
evidence.8  The third variety of exclusionary rule, 'the so-called Mi-
randa9 rule, concerns incriminatory statements made by a party
in custody who has been kept uninformed of the constitutional
rights to silence and to counsel during police interrogation. Mi-
randa maintains, in effect, that unless custodial questioning is pre-
ceded by a "warning" as to the interrogated party's fifth and sixth
amendment rights, any confession subsequently obtained must be
excluded from trial.10 Thus, the Miranda rule is both a constitu-
tionally derived standard of evidence and a court created rule of
police procedure.1 '
of such an admissibility determination now is "to safeguard the right of an
individual . . . not to be compelled to condemn himself by his own utter-
ances." Lego v. Twoney, 404 U.S. 477, 485 (1972).
5. Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 540-51 (1961); Lisbena v. Cali-
fornia, 314 U.S. 219, 237 (1941). Thus, it is now "axiomatic that a defendant
... is deprived of due process of law if his conviction is founded, in whole
or in part, upon an involuntary confession." Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368,
376 (1964).
6. Davis v. North Carolina, 384 U.S. 737, 740 (1966); Malloy v. Hogan,
378 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1964); Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 474-75 (1921);
Brain v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 542 (1897).
7. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963); but cf. United
States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974). In Wong Sun the Court stated that
if a direct relationship could be established between an illegal search and
the defendant's confession, then the confession must be held inadmissible.
Other cases have applied this exclusionary rule to confessions "triggered"
by the presentation of illegally seized evidence to the accused. See McCloud
v. Bounds, 474 F.2d 968, 970 (4th Cir. 1973); Amador-Gonzalez v. United
States, 391 F.2d 308, 318 (5th Cir. 1968); Barnett v. United States, 384 F.2d
848, 861-62 (5th Cir. 1967); United States v. Jones, 352 F. Supp. 369, 378
(S.D. Ga. 1972).
8. See generally Note, Admissibility of Confessions Made Subsequent
to an Illegal Arrest: Wong Sun v. United States Revisited, 61 J. Cusm. L.
207 (1970).
9. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
10. Id. at 444-45. The Miranda Court did not formulate its exclusionary
rule to provide a standard for weighing the actual voluntariness of the con-
fession. Rather, the Court set its rule to check the potential for involuntary
admission of guilt by an accused "run through menacing police procedures"
by necessitating that the police undertake "at the outset of the interrogation
to insure that the statements were truly the product of free choice." Id.
at 457.
11. See generally Elsen and Rosett, Protection for the Suspect under
Miranda v. Arizona, 67 COLum. L. REV. 645 (1967). In Michigan v. Tucker,
417 U.S. 433 (1974), Justice Rehnquist nevertheless emphasized in his
majority opinion that the Miranda warnings are not themselves mandated
by the Constitution but are rather prophylactic standards established by
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Unlike the preceding three rules governing the exclusion of ex-
trajudicial confessions a fourth, the McNabb-Mallory" rule, is not
constitutionally derived. Dealing with incriminatory statements
procured during a period of delay 'between the accused's arrest and
his arraignment, the rule is not directed at police failure to observe
the arrested party's constitutional rights.'3  Rather, the McNabb-
Mallory rule is invoked when there has been -a failure by police
to obey their statutory duty of prompt arraignment. 14 Confessions
Obtained consequent to a breach of that duty are inadmissible in
evidence.15 It is the -pplication of this exclusionary rule that is
the topic of this Comment.
On April 20, 1972, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Com-
monwealth v. Futch16 adopted a rule of exclusion similar to the
the Court to safeguard the constitutional privilege against compulsory
self-incrimination. Id. at 444. The import of this statement is somewhat
lessened both by fact that the police conduct under scrutiny in Tucker
had occurred prior to the Miranda Court's ruling, and by fact that the
evidence sought to be suppressed in Tucker was not the statements of the
accused himself but merely evidence derived therefrom.
12. The rule was first announced in McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S.
332 (1943), then subsequently restated in the context of FED. R. CRIM. P.
5(a) by the court in Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957). It is
variously referred to as the McNabb, McNabb-Mallory, or simply Mallory
rule. This Comment will employ these three designations.
13. Because this rule was not formulated by the Supreme Court under
some constitutional rubric, but was created through the exercise of the Su-
preme Court's supervisory powers over the administration of justice in the
federal court system, it has not been held binding on state courts. Gallegos
v. Nebraska, 342 U.S. 55, 63-64 (1951); Webb v. Beto, 415 F.2d 433, 436 (5th
Cir. 1969); United States ex rel. Russo v. New Jersey, 351 F.2d 429, 433 (3d
Cir. 1965). See also Commonwealth v. Johnson, 365 Pa. 303, 74 A.2d 144
(1950), rev'd on other grounds, 340 U.S. 881.
14. It should be noted that there exists no constitutional mandate that
an arrested party shall be preliminarily arraigned prior to trial. United
States ex rel. Hughes v. Gault, 271 U.S. 142, 152 (1926); United States v.
Farries, 459 F.2d 1057, 1062 (3d Cir. 1972); State v. Mastrian, 285 Minn. 51,
58, 171 N.W.2d 695, 701 (1969). See Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359,
363 (1956). The right to arraignment, i.e., the right to be brought before an
officer of the court following one's arrest, exists only by force of a legislated
rule of criminal procedure. See, e.g., FED. R. CRM. P. 5(a); GA. CODE ANN.
§ 27-212 (1972); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-13-17 (Supp. 1973). Generally, un-
der a statutory scheme of criminal procedure an arraignment proceeding
serves to ensure that an arrested party will be informed by a judicial officer
of the charges against him, his right to bail and to counsel, and his right
to a hearing on probable cause. See, e.g., FED. R. CRaM. P. 5(a); N.Y. Canm.
Pno. § 170.10 (McKinney 1971); PA. R. CRIM. P. 140 (Supp. 1974). Despite
the importance of the arraignment process, failure of an arresting officer to
obey the arraignment rule of his jurisdiction is usually considered a mere
misdemeanor and not a violation of due process. See Lisbena v. California,
314 U.S. 219, 234-35 (1941).
15. Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449, 453 (1957).
16. 447 Pa. 389, 290 A.2d 417 (1972).
McNabb-Mallory rule. After reviewing the nature of defendant
Futch's fifteen hour period of post-arrest detention before arraign-
ment, the Pennsylvania court ruled inadmissible evidence obtained
from the accused during the delay in arraignment.' 7  Prior to its
decision in Futch the court had stated that a period of delay was
not of itself controlling on the issue of admissibility.' Instead, de-
lay was held to be merely one factor among several to be jointly
considered in determining the voluntariness of a confession. 19
Thus, by holding that unnecessary delay in arraignment may of
itself be sufficient to invalidate evidence elicited during the delay,
the Futch decision repudiated the past policy of the court to reject
the reasoning of McNabb v. United States. 20 The Futch court
thereby established Pennsylvania as the sole state jurisdiction to
substantially embrace the McNabb-Mallory doctrine.
2'
In contrast to Pennsylvania's recent acceptance of the McNabb-
Mallory standard, the federal courts have in the past few years
begun to question strict adherence to the McNabb exclusionary
rule.22 Prior to 1968, the federal courts with some exceptions had
interpreted the rule as being applicable notwithstanding any con-
sideration of the voluntariness of the confession extracted during
delay. 23 However, this application has been brought into doubt by
the wording of Title II of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe
Streets Act of 1968,24 an attempt by Congress to dictate federal
rules 25 of evidentiary admissibility chiefly in terms of voluntari-
ness. 28  The degree to which Title II alters or nullifies application
17. Id. at 391, 290 A.2d at 418.
18. Commonwealth v. Shupp, 365 Pa. 439, 446, 75 A.2d 587, 590 (1950).
19. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Koch, 446 Pa. 469, 474, 288 A.2d 791,
793-94 (1972); Commonwealth v. Johnson, 365 Pa. 303, 314-15, 74 A.2d 144,
149 (1950), rev'd on other grounds, 340 U.S. 881.
20. 318 U.S. 332 (1943).
21. For a compilation of the near unanimity of states rejecting applica-
tion of the McNabb-Mallory rule see 3 J. WIGMORE, WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE
§ 862 (a) n.56 (Chadbourn rev. 1970). See also note 166 infra.
22. See, e.g., United States v. Collins, 462 F.2d 792 (2d Cir. 1972). In
the course of determining the admissibility of a confession obtained nearly
a day after the accused's arrest, the court commented that "the present via-
bility of the McNabb-Mallory rule is open to serious quetion." Id. at 796.
23. See United States v. Sailer, 309 F.2d 541 (6th Cir. 1963), cert. de-
nied, 374 U.S. 835. "The McNabb rule prohibits the use in criminal trial
of confessions obtained during illegal detention of a defendant, whether or
not the confession is the result of torture, physical or mental." Id. at 542.
24. The portion of the act dealing with the admissibility of confessions
is contained in 18 U.S.C. § 3501 (1968). See note 144 infra.
25. The source of Congress' authority to establish rules governing the
federal courts is in Article III, section 1 of the Constitution which states:
"The judicial Power of the United States shall be vested in one supreme
Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may ordain and estab-
lish."
26. 18 U.S.C. § 3501 begins:
(a) In any criminal prosecution brought by the United States or
by the District of Columbia, a confession . . . shall be admissible
in evidence if it is voluntarily given.
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,of the McNabb-Mallory rule remains open to question. However,
an answer has been suggested by the actual manner in which the
federal courts have chosen to apply 18 U.S.C. § 350127 with regard
to the admissibility of confessions made between arrest and arraign-
ment. In the past McNabb-Mallory has been utilized by the courts
to enforce Rule 5(a)'s28 procedural mandate of arraignment "with-
out unnecessary delay." Thus, the degree to which federal courts
today have chosen to circumvent McNabb-Mallory in favor of the
newly legislated standard of evidence also represents the degree
to which these courts are unwilling to ensure unvarying police obe-
dience of the arraignment rule. Yet, despite the uncertainty of the
federal courts both as to the necessity for strict judicial enforcement
of Rule 5 (a) and as to the current viability of the McNabb exclu-
sionary rule in light of the congressional intent behind Title II2
9
guidance from the Supreme Court has not as yet been forthcoming.
I. DEVELOPMENT OF TIM McNabb-Mallory RULE
Prior to McNabb v. United States, 0 the Supreme Court had
rejected prolonged pre-arraignment detention as adequate grounds
for excluding from evidence a confession made during such deten-
tion. Since delay in arraignment was itself not a violation of due
process,31 i.e., not per se relevant to the assurance of voluntariness,
27. The relationship between delay in arraignment and the admissi-
bility of a confession made during that period is dealt with in 18 U.S.C. §
3501 (c) which states in part:
[A] confession made or given by a person . . . while such person
was under arrest or other detention in the custody of any law-en-
forcement officer or law-enforcement agency, shall not be inadmis-
sible solely because of delay in bringing such person before a mag-
istrate . . . if such confession is found by the trial judge to have
been made voluntarily. . . and if such confssion was made or given
within six hours immediately following his arrest or other deten-
tion....
28. FED. R. Clvm. P. 5(a) [hereinafter referred to as Rule 5(a)]. See
note 70 infra.
29. Senator Hugh Scott, a member of the Senate Judiciary Committee,
interpreted Title II in this way:
The title would restore the test of admissibility of confessions in
criminal cases to that time-tested and well founded standard of vol-
untariness. It would avoid the inflexible rule of excluding such
statements solely on technical grounds. . . . We have not nullified,
however, the rights of defendants to the safeguards of the federal
law or the Constitution. On the contrary, we have provided a more
reasonable rule in that the judge shall consider all the defendant's
rights (speedy arraignment, silence, counsel, knowledge of the of-
fense charged) and their possible violation in deciding as to the
voluntariness of the confession and thus its admissibility.
S. REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., quoted in 1968 U.S. Code Cong. &
Adm. News 2282.
30. 318 U.S. 332 (1943).
31. Lisbena v. California, 314 U.S. 215, 235 (1941).
only if the detention were tainted by coercive circumstances woa..,
a federal court take notice of such delay in determining the admissi-
bility of evidence under the voluntariness standard.32 Further-
more, recognizing the complex of coercive influences which could
be present in custodial interrogation, the Supreme Court had also
concluded that very often no one element in a case could be identi-
fied as the particular factor precipitating the involuntary confession;
thus, rather than depend upon there always being a readily identifi-
able occurrence indicating rights to due process and to silence had
been violated, the Court over the years adopted a "totality of the
circumstances" test3 3 to measure the voluntariness of an admission
in each case. Under such a test of admissibility delay in arraign-
ment became simply one circumstance to be considered within, but
not apart from, the whole. This approach made it thus apparent
that delay, as an isolated event, could be significant only to the
degree it provided the opportunity for the involuntary confession in
question to occur.
34
Apart from its "totality of the circumstances" consideration of
the coercive factors violative of the constitutional safeguards of due
process and the right against self-incrimination, the Supreme Court
in another line of cases beginning with McNabb v. United States3
directed its attention to those law enforcement practices which pro-
vided the potential for infringement of the very constitutional safe-
guards the Court sought to ensure. One of those practices which
concerned the Court was police failure to promptly arraign a party
following arrest. It was the significance of this failure that the
Court examined in McNabb.
A. The McNabb Decision
The defendants in McNabb were Tennessee "moonshiners" of
,backwoods origin and limited education. During an attempt by fed-
eral law officers to entrap the McNabbs in the illegal sale of un-
taxed whiskey to government informers, a federal revenue agent
was shot and killed pursuing the defendants through a darkened
cemetery. In the early 'hours of the following morning the defend-
ants were arrested and brought to a detention room in the Federal
Building in Chattanooga. 3  Kept from communicating with family
32. See Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936) (five day delay be-
tween arrest and arraignment after which time four black suspects, sub-
jected to physical torture and made to fear for their bodily welfare, subse-
quently confessed).
33. Fikes v. Alabama, 352 U.S. 191, 197 (1957); Watts v. Indiana, 338
U.S. 49, 53 (1948). See also Davis v. North Carolina, 384 U.S. 736 (1966);
Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503 (1963).
34. See note 126 infra.
35. 318 U.S. 332 (1943).
36. The Supreme Court concluded from the record that following ar-
rest of the defendants, federal agents had failed to bring them before a mag-
istrate but had immediately proceeded with the interrogation. Id. at 334.
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or friends, over a period of two days the five McNabbs were inter-
rogated individually and in pairs, at irregular intervals of several
hours each, by at least half a dozen agents. Interrogation ceased
only when federal investigators felt they had elicited an unqualified
admission of guilt from one arrestee, and ihcriminatory statements
from two others. Three of the five McNabbs were subsequently
convicted at criminal trial.
On appeal to the Supreme Court the defendants claimed that
their statements were obtained in violation of the right against self-
incrimination. The government countered by maintaining that
since only involuntary confessions were constitutionally prohibited
and no involuntariness could be ascribed to the statements made,
the confessions had therefore been properly admitted at trial.
However, while cognizant of -both the constitutional issue raised by
the defendants' argument and the circumstances surrounding the
defendants' confinement and interrogation, the Supreme Court de-
clined to reach a decision based on constitutional considerations.8 7
Instead, the Court established an independent standard of review
founded on the exercise of its "supervisory authority over the ad-
ministration of criminal justice in the federal courts" and its power
to formulate "rules of evidence to be applied in federal criminal
prosecutions."38
Before arriving at its decision the Court noted that congres-
sional legislation prescribed that following federal arrest a party
be promptly taken before the nearest United States magistrate for
arraignment. It also inferred from the facts of the case that the
arresting officers had circumvented this procedural mandate. Thus,
the Court in subsequently excluding the confessions declared:
Plainly a conviction resting on evidence secured through
a flagrant disregard of the procedure which Congress has
After the Supreme Court remanded, it was nevertheless demonstrated upon
retrial that the defendants had indeed been arraigned prior to the interroga-
tion in question. Thus, the three defendants who had made incriminating
statements during post-arraignment interrogation were convicted on the
strength of these original confessions. The convictions of the second trial
were appealed but on review were upheld by the court of appeals, which
noted that there was nothing to show "that the atmosphere surrounding the
examination of the appellants indicated coercion or violence, either mental
or physical, such as would constitute denial of due process." McNabb v.
United States, 142 F.2d 904, 908 (6th Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 771.
37. In finding it "unnecessary" to resolve the constitutional issues in
the case, the Court observed that while its review of state criminal convic-
tions was limited to due process considerations, the scope of its power of re-
view over federal convictions was not limited merely to questions of consti-
tutional validity. McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 340 (1943).
38. Id. at 341.
commanded cannot be allowed to stand without making the
courts accomplices in willful disobedience of the law. Con-
gress has not explicitly forbidden the use of evidence so
procured. But to permit such evidence to be made the ba-
sis of a conviction in the federal courts would stultify the
policy which Congress has enacted into law.39
The Court perceived the legislative purpose of the arraignment stat-
utes40 cited in the case to be both limitation of the opportunity
for physical coercion and secret interrogation, and assurance of the
validity of evidence presented at trial.41 Though finding neither
that the defendants had been subjected to physical duress during
delay, nor that the confessions obtained had been rendered testi-
monially untrustworthy by the circumstances of the detention, the
Court was aware that such possibilities could arise if, after an arrest,
defendants were not promptly arraigned, i.e., if prolonged pre-
arraignment detention were tolerated by the courts. 42 Therefore, by
excluding those confessions obtained at a time when the arrested
party should have been presented by police for a first appearance
before a judicial officer, the McNabb Court intended to establish a
prophylactic rule of evidence. Such an exclusionary rule would be
both a means of preventing police neglect of the accused's legal
right to prompt arraignment and a safeguard against government
use of unconstitutional methods to extract confessions from arrested
persons kept from the sight of the court. It is thus apparent that the
McNabb Court by its decision hoped to remind federal law-enforce-
ment officials that it could no longer condone procedural violations
intended to secure inculpatory statements sufficient to sustain a
conviction.
43
B. Dimensions of the McNabb Rule
The Supreme Court in McNabb based its ruling of admissibility
upon the particular set of facts in the case, and therefore its decision
lacked a succinct articulation of the exclusionary rule that had been
employed.44 As a result, questions later arose in federal courts as to
39. Id. at 345.
40. Act of Aug. 18, 1894, ch. 301, § 1, 28 Stat. 798; Act of Mar. 1, 1879,
ch. 125, § 9, 20 Stat. 327. The Court also observed that similar statutes gov-
erning arraignment exist in most of the states. McNabb v. United States,
318 U.S. 332, 342 n.7 (1943). For a more recent though still somewhat dated
compilation of state arraignment statutes see MODEL CODE OF PEPIaAUGN-
MENT PROCEDURE, Appendix IV (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1966).
41. The Court commented that the procedural safeguard of prompt ar-
raignment prevents "easy but self-defeating way in which brutality is sub-
stituted for brains as an instrument of crime detection." McNabb v. United
States, 318 U.S. 332, 344 (1943) (emphasis added).
42. Id. at 344-45.
43. However, it should be noted that the Court's intent was not to ex-
clude all confessions obtained during pre-arraignment detention. "The
mere fact that a confession was made while in the custody of police does
not render it inadmissible." Id. at 346.
44. In summing the Court's decision Justice Frankfurter broadly
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both when the rule was to be applied and what illicit conduct by
police was sufficient to vitiate an otherwise voluntary confession
made during custody. Exemplary of the effect of the ambiguity
within the Supreme Court's opinion is the broad assertion made by
one federal court soon after McNabb that any confession extracted
prior to arraignment was inadmissible,45 a presumptive though log-
ical extension of the McNabb ruling.
The validity of the aforementioned interpretation of McNabb
was examined by the Supreme Court in United States v. Mitchell.
46
Arrested on suspicion of larceny the defendant in Mitchell admitted
the charge soon after being brought to police headquarters. After
his confession the defendant was then detained for over a week
before being brought before a magistrate. The police justified this
delay by claiming that the defendant had consented to the pro-
longed detention in order to aid police in their investigation of other
crimes the defendant had allegedly committed. On review of the
case the court of appeals, citing the recent decision in McNabb, in-
validated the confession because the defendant's detention had been
rendered illegal by the lack of prompt arraignment. 47 However,
the appellate court's decision was reversed by the Supreme Court
which found the confession to be "spontaneous," i.e., made imme-
diately on or after arrest, and therefore not the product of police
breach of duty.48 Thus, while affirming its previous holding in Mc-
Nabb the Court refused to exclude a confession given prior to a
period of illegal delay even though the accused was not subse-
quently arraigned until much after his arrest.
The Mitchell Court in refusing to apply the McNabb exclusion-
ary rule to so-called "threshold" or "spontaneous" confessions based
its decision on the fact that by submitting the confession at trial
the government was not, in effect, making use of the "fruits of the
wrongdoings of its officers. '49 Such a confession itself would there-
fore be free of any "taint" of prior illegality, even though the ar-
rested party had been denied his legal right to prompt arraignment.
Thus, in the Mitchell holding the Supreme Court made two de-
stated: "[A] decent regard for the duty of the courts as agencies of justice
and custodians of liberty forbids men should be convicted upon evidence
secured under the circumstances revealed here." Id. at 347 (emphasis
added).
45. United States v. Haupt, 136 F.2d 661, 667-68 (7th Cir. 1943) (dic-
tum).
46. 322 U.S.65 (1944).
47. United States v. Mitchell, 78 U.S. App. D.C. 171, 138 F.2d 426 (D.C.
Cir.), rev'd, 322 U.S. 65 (1944).
48. United States v. Mitchell, 322 U.S. 65, 70 (1944).
49. Id.
terminations. The first was that for an incriminatory admission
to be ruled inadmissible it must have been made consequent to il-
legal police conduct and not merely prior to the illegality. The
second determination was that despite the Court's desire not to
sanction violations of statutory duty which would give rise to the
dangers noted by McNabb, the Court would not utilize its authority
to establish evidentiary standards as an indirect mode of disciplin-
ing police misconduct. 50 It is therefore evident from these deter-
minations that the Court was unwilling to broaden the scope of its
supervisory powers where it could not be shown that the police had
enjoyed some consequence or "fruit" of their own breach of duty or
misconduct.
Federal courts following the "fruits of the -poisonous tree" doc-
trine of Mitchell have refused to apply the McNabb exclusionary
rule where the defendant's illegal detention was not instrumental
in securing inculpatory statements sufficient to aid in conviction.
Thus, in Theriault v. United States,51 because no evidence was ob-
tained from the accused during delay between arrest and arraign-
ment, the court held that his conviction could not be set aside
merely on the grounds of illegal detention. Similarly, where in-
criminatory statements were made during delay, but not later used
in evidence, it has been held that the reasoning of McNabb may
not be used to overturn a conviction if it could not be shown that
the defendant had been "prejudiced" in his trial by any fruits of
the delay.5 2 However, where the inculpatory admission has been
used in evidence, it has nevertheless been held that the confession
would not be excluded if given prior to arrest " or subsequent to
arraignment 54 though there was an intervening period of illegal de-
lay and detention. Likewise, a period of impermissible delay fol-
lowing a "spontaneous" or "threshold" confession given on arrest
50. Id. at 71.
51. 401 F.2d 79, 86 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1100 (1968); see
Morse v. United States, 256 F.2d 280 (5th Cir. 1958). The defendant was
illegally detained for forty-six hours. Though interrogated throughout this
period, he refused to make any confession. The court of appeals held that
defendant's conviction was not invalidated by the illegal delay in arraign-
ment since no evidence extracted during the delay had been introduced at
trial. Id. at 280.
52. United States v. Grandi, 424 F.2d 399, 403 (2d Cir. 1970); see also
Lovelace v. United States, 357 F.2d 306 (5th Cir. 1966); Coleman v. United
States, 111 U.S. App. D.C. 210, 295 F.2d 555 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
53. Gray v. United States, 394 F.2d 96, 99 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 393
U.S. 985 (1967). It is apparent that such a holding depends upon what is
considered sufficient to distinguish arrest or custodial interrogation from
mere police inquiry of persons not under restraint. See Miranda v. Arizona,
384 U.S. 436, 477-78 (1966).
54. Amsler v. United States, 381 F.2d 37, 47 (9th Cir. 1967). However,
if there exists a dependent relationship between a post-arraignment confes-
sion and an admission made during illegal detention thereby subject
to exclusion, the post-arraignment confession will also be suppressed as
"fruit" of the illicit delay. Feuger v. United States, 302 F,2d 214 251 (8th
Cir.), cert. denied, 371 'U.. 872 (19q),
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has been determined to be inadequate grounds for invoking the Mc-
Nabb exclusionary rule.15 But, in line with the "fruit" of illegal
delay reasoning, it has also been held that if there is a delay in
arraignment used to elicit a written elaboration of a "threshold"
confession, the written statement itself will be excluded from evi-
dence. 56
If construed together, United States v. Mitchell and the cases
reviewed above suggest a checklist of the sequential elements that
must be present for the McNabb rule to be applied. These elements
are: (1) arrest or police custody prior to confession; (2) breach of
statutory duty to promptly arraign; (3) confession subsequent to
delay but prior to arraignment itself; and (4) use of the inculpatory
statement in evidence. Though a case may involve illegal deten-
tion, without each of these four elements the McNabb exclusionary
rule may not be used either to suppress a confession submitted in
evidence or to overturn a federal conviction appealed on the basis
of delay in arraignment.
C. Circumstances Surrounding the Confession
Though United States v. Mitchell57 helped clarify the sequential
relationship between illegal detention and confession relevant to ap-
plication of the McNabb exclusionary rule, it raised a question of its
own concerning the significance of any "aggravating circumstances"
or coercive factors surrounding the confession and their importance
to application of the rule. Speaking for the Mitchell Court Justice
Frankfurter summarized the basis of the McNabb decision this way:
Inexcusable detention for the purpose of extracting evi-
dence from an accused, and the successful extraction of
such inculpatory statements by continuous questioning for
many hours under psychological pressure, were the decisive
features in the McNabb case which led us to rule that con-
viction on such evidence cannot stand.58
Citing the language of Justice Frankfurter, the court of appeals
in Upshaw v. United States9 held that absent a showing of psycho-
logical duress and prolonged interrogation as was present in Mc-
55. United States v. Seohnlein, 423 F.2d 1051, 1053 (4th Cir. 1970); see
Parman v. United States, 310 U.S. App. D.C. 188, 399 F.2d 599 (D.C. Cir.
1968); United States v. Sterling, 321 F. Supp. 1301 (D. La. 1971).
56. Naples v. United States, 113 U.S. App. D.C. 281, 307 F.2d 618 (D.C.
Cir. 1962). "
57. 322 U.S. 65 (1944).
58. Id. at 67 (emphasis added).
59. 83 U.S. App. D.C. 207, 168 F.2d 167 (D.C. Cir.), rev'd, 355 U.S. 410
(1947).
Nabb, a defendant could not claim that unnecessary delay in ar-
raignment was relevant to the issue of the admissibility of a con-
fession given during that period. The appellate court therefore con-
cluded that despite the fact that the accused had been subjected
to a thirty hour period of illegal detention prior to arraignment,
the defendant's confession could not 'be excluded from evidence
since the confession was made free from coercive influences. The
court further observed that in holding the defendant for such a
length of time prior to presentment before a magistrate, the police
were merely following accepted standard interrogation procedure.
On these determinations the court, borrowing the words of the
Mitchell decision, declared it would not utilize rules of evidence in
order to discipline the police.60
On review of the appellate court's decision of the Upshaw case,
the Supreme Court repudiated the court of appeals' reasonings and
held the defendant's confession, as a product of illegal delay, was
improperly admitted at trial.6 ' Because it was based on the im-
properly obtained confession, the defendant's conviction was there-
fore reversed. The appellate court's conclusion that the McNabb
rule was merely another test of voluntariness, i.e., a rule based upon
the presence or absence of prolonged interrogation and psychologi-
cal pressure during delay, was also directly refuted by the Supreme
Court. In doing so the Court noted that coercive factors had been
mentioned in McNabb merely to demonstrate the failure of the Mc-
Nabbs' interrogators to promptly arraign the defendants following
custody. The Supreme Court further observed that its decision in
Mitchell, though not applying the McNabb rule, did reaffirm that
the rule was intended to exclude confessions obtained during imper-
missible delay regardless of any question of voluntariness.6 2 There-
fore, it was not the presence of prolonged interrogation or mental
duress that had been the immediate concern of the Mitchell deci-
sion. Rather, it was the use of delay to obtain a confession that
had been the basis of the Court's finding. Thus, the Supreme Court
in Upshaw after reviewing the facts of the case determined that
the defendant's confession had resulted from an illegal detention,
i.e., impermissible prearraignment delay, intended to provide time
to elicit an inculpatory statement which would aid in the defend-
ant's conviction. By suppressing the Upshaw confession the Court
recognized that the aim of the McNabb rule was to discourage use
of detention in deferment of the duty to arraign and that the pres-
ence or absence of coercion was therefore irrelevant to application
of the rule.63
Although the Upshaw decision employed the McNabb exclu-
60. Id. at 209, 168 F.2d at 169.
61. Upshaw v. United States, 335 U.S. 410 (1948).
62. Id. at 413.
63. Id. at 413-14.
Comments
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
sionary rule independent of any determination of voluntariness, the
language of Upshaw is not itself free from contrary implications.
Thus, while the Upshaw Court refused to base its decision upon a
finding of involuntariness, it nonetheless termed the confession one
"induced by illegal detention, '6 4 a phrase suggesting that a McNabb
determination is based on a cause and effect relationship be-
tween delay and confession and on the presence of coercion. The
causality standard, however, is more appropriately applied to the
question of the confession's voluntariness, a constitutional consid-
eration which the Supreme Court in Upshaw found no need to ad-
dress itself to.65 Yet, where a court in -applying the McNabb rule
speaks of a confession being "induced" by illegal detention connota-
tions of causality, and hence coercion, arise.
Ambiguity concerning both the scope of the McNabb exclu-
sionary rule and the relevance of the voluntariness question to the
rule's application may nevertheless be resolved if it is understood
that the Supreme Court had adopted sub silentio a "but for" test
rather than a causality standard for the exclusionary rule. Such
a test simply asks: but for the creation of illegal delay in arraign-
ment would the confession have been obtained? If the confession
occurred before the arrest, after the arraignment, or prior to the
illegal detention itself, then the answer must be no. If the confes-
sion directly followed the impermissible delay, then it can be said
that illegal police conduct "induced" the inculpatory admission.
Since the purpose of the McNabb rule is to deter violation of the
arraignment requirement by preventing police from "profiting"
from the fruits of their violation, the "but for" test fits this purpose
well. Thus, the test at once leaves the issues of voluntariness to
separate evaluation,66 and focuses determination of admissibility on
the sequential relationship between illegal delay and confession dis-
cussed earlier.67
D. When Impermissible Delay Arises
Although illegal detention is the operative factor in the Mc-
64. United States v. Mitchell, 322 U.S. 65, 70 (1944), as quoted in Up-
shaw v. United States, 335'U.S. 410, 413 (1948).
65. Upshaw v. United States, 335 U.S. 410, 414 n.2 (1948).
66. It has been suggested that illegal detention preceding a confession
made during delay gives rise to a presumption of involuntariness. Hogan
and Snee, The McNabb-Mallory Rule: Its Rise, Rationale, and Rescue, 47
GEO. L.J. 1, 28 (1958). However, employment of such a presumption would
certainly lead to the very confusion of issues which the Upshaw decision
sought to avoid.
67. See text preceding note 57 supra.
Nabb exclusionary rule, the McNabb 5 and Mitchell"9 decisions give
no indication at what point -after arrest a delay in arraignment be-
comes illegal detention. While both decisions speak of failure to
"promptly" arraign, they do so only in terms of the number of
hours or days between arrest and presentment before a judicial offi-
cer. Impermissible delay, and hence illegal detention, is therefore
treated 'by these decisions as a quantitative determination. How-
ever, a qualitative element was added to the definition of impermis-
sible delay by Rule 5 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure,
70
which became effective March 21, 1946 and superseded the "prompt
arraignment" statutes under which McNabb and Mitchell were de-
cided. Thus, instead of speaking in terms of "prompt arraignment,"
Rule 5 (a) mandates arraignment without "unnecessary delay."
The question of "unnecessary delay" was first dealt with by
the Supreme Court in Upshaw v. United States.71 There the Court
found that pre-arraignment detention for the -purpose of extracting
sufficient evidence to support a conviction was "unnecessary delay"
within the meaning of Rule 5(a). 72 This view was subsequently
affirmed by the Court in Mallory v. United States.7 3 In Mallory
the defendant and two other suspects, relatives fitting the general
description of the defendant, were arrested on suspicion of rape.
Though possessing other evidence sufficient to sustain a probable
cause determination against the defendant himself, the police nev-
ertheless subjected Mallory to a series of long examinations at police
headquarters. These examinations were conducted without the po-
lice either informing the defendant of his rights or attempting to
bring him before an available magistrate. Only when the defend-
ant -after several hours finally confessed did the police try to have
68. McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943).
69. United States v. Mitchell, 322 U.S. 65 (1944).
70. F-D. R. Cam. P. 5:
(a) Appearance before the Commissioner. An officer making
an arrest under a warrant issued upon a complaint or any person
making an arrest without a warrant shall take the arrested person
without unnecessary delay before the nearest available commis-
sioner or before any other nearby officer empowered to commit
persons charged with offenses against the laws of the United States.
When a person arrested without a warrant is brought before a com-
missioner or other officier, a complaint shall be filed forthwith.
(emphasis added).
(b) Statement by the Commissioner. The commissioner shall
inform the defendant of the complaint against him and of any affi-
davit filed therewith, of his right to retain counsel, of his right to
request the assignment of counsel if he is unable to obtain coun-
sel, and of the right to have a preliminary examination. He shall
also inform the defendant that he is not required to make a state-
ment and that any statement made by him may be used against
him. The commissioner shall allow the defendant reasonable time
and opportunity to consult counsel and shall admit the defendant
to bail as provided in these rules.
Amended Oct. 17, 1968 to read "magistrate" in place of "commissioner."
Amended but left substantially unchanged April 24, 1972.
71. 335 U.S. 410 (1948).
72. Id. at 414.
73. 354 U.S. 449 (1957).
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him arraigned. At trial, since there was no proof of physical or
psychological coercion, the confession was admitted and the defend-
ant found guilty by the jury.74 However, the Supreme Court later
reversed the conviction finding that the confession had been ob-
tained in violation of arraignment without "unnecessary delay"
mandated by Rule 5 (a).
In determining that "unnecessary delay" was apparent in the
facts before it, the Supreme Court in Mallory took note of the im-
mediate availability of committing magistrates in the vicinity of the
defendant's place of detention. The Court further observed that ar-
raignment could have easily taken place even in the same building
in which the defendant had been interrogated and detained for
some eight hours prior to his written confession. Thus, it was not
the span of hours between the accused's afternoon arrest and ar-
raignment the next morning that gave rise to the determination
of "unnecessary delay." Rather, the delay became unnecessary
when the arresting officers could have made use of an accessible
magistrate, but failed to do so in order to elicit an admission of
guilt from the defendant.7 5 The "unnecessary delay" in arraign-
ment thus became inextricably bound to purpose of the delay, in-
terrogation, which in turn had as its goal the extraction of evidence
sufficient to support a probable cause determination or ultimately
a conviction. Hence, in holding the written confession inadmissible
under the McNabb exclusionary rule, the Court acted to frustrate
the interrogative purpose behind "unnecessary delay" and to insure
compliance with the mandate of Rule 5(a) governing the right of
an arrested party to a first appearance before a judicial officer.7 6
Thus, whereas the McNabb decision established the means by which
prompt arraignment would be judicially enforced, i.e., the exclu-
sionary rule, and the Upshaw holding distinguished grounds for ex-
cluding confessions under the McNabb rule from those grounds for
exclusion under the voluntariness standard, Mallory, within the
context of the arraignment statute's intent, attempted to delimit
the very nature of statutorily prohibited delay.
Yet, though stressing that police compliance with Rule 5(a) was
74. United States v. Mallory, 98 App. D.C. 406, 236 F.2d 701 (D.C. Cir.
1956).
75. Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449, 456 (1957); see also United
States v. Mayes, 417 F.2d 771, 772 (9th Cir. 1969).
76. Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449, 454-55. Besides giving the
accused notice of his constitutional rights, a function also performed by the
so-called Miranda warning, arraignment serves to inform the accused of his
right to bail and to a preliminary examination of probable cause. See FED.
R. CRIM. P. 5 (b) contained in text to note 70 supra.
necessary to ensure that an arrested person be quickly "advised of
his rights and . . the issue of probable cause . . . be promptly de-
termined,""7 the Mallory decision nevertheless indicated that the
duty to arraign "without unnecessary delay" did not call for "me-
chanical or automatic obedience. s7 8 It was thus held that delay
could be justified for routine booking procedures after arrest or for
quick verification through a third party of the accused's volun-
teered statements.7" As such, these might be said to constitute pe-
riods of "necessary" or "permissible" delay. However, there is
nothing in the Mallory decision to indicate these two justifications
were to comprise an all inclusive list of permissible delays. This
is because the distinction made between permissible and impermis-
sible delay was held to be dependent upon the purpose for which
the delay was created, i.e., its "necessity", rather than upon its mere
length. Thus, by the reasoning in Mallory, if a delay in arraign-
ment has not arisen for the sole purpose of subjecting the accused
to interrogation, it is not prohibited by Rule 5(a), and therefore
any evidence obtained during that delay would not be excludable
under the McNabb rule. Permissible delay need not be limited to
merely the two instances enumerated in Mallory, so long as the
necessity for the delay was not caused by the intent to interrogate.
Such an instance of permissible delay was found by the court
of appeals in United States v. Marrero.8 0 There the defendant was
arrested in the evening by federal agents, booked, then lodged in
a federal house of detention until arraignment the next day. How-
ever, the defendant was not interrogated during any of these proce-
dures. Citing the Mallory decision the court, contrary to defend-
ant's contention, held that overnight incarceration was not an "un-
necessary delay" in arraignment since no magistrate was available
during that time." Nor did the court find that the "customary
pedigree interview"8 2 of the defendant by the Assistant United
States Attorney, just prior to presentment before the magistrate,
constituted violation of Rule 5(a). It therefore concluded that the
inculpatory admissions made by the defendant immediately follow-
ing the interview were admissible under the McNabb-Mallory rule.
The court arrived at this conclusion by observing that neither the
overnight detention nor the interview prior to arraignment consti-
tuted delay initiated for the purpose of subjecting the accused to
interrogation intended to elicit incriminating statements.8
In addition to the Marrero determination it has been decided
77. Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449, 454 (1957).
78. Id. at 455.
79. Id.
80. 450 F.2d 373 (2d Cir. 1971).
81. Id. at 376.
82. Such an interview is used primarily to establish the identity and
background of the arrested party.
83. United States v. Marrero, 450 F.2d 373, 376 (2d Cir. 1971).
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that no violation of Rule 5 (a) arises where after overnight incarcer-
ation of the accused in a federal detention center, an administrative
error by detention officials resulted in failure to locate the accused
in time for speedy arraignment.8 4 One court has gone so far as
to hold not unreasonable a lapse of twenty-six hours between de-
fendant's arrest by local police cooperating with federal authorities
and federal arraignment in the same city. 5 There the court
found the lengthy delay necessary in view of the complexities of
transfer procedures between local and federal police, the unavail-
ability of a magistrate at the time of the arrest, and the consider-
able time necessary to transport the defendant from one place to
another.8 8 Furthermore, it has also been held that there is no "un-
necessary delay" in arraignment, if after waiving his Miranda rights
the accused delays the arraignment himself by volunteering a
lengthy statement of complicity."' Similarly, no illegal delay has
been found if the accused voluntarily assists police in the apprehen-
sion of a second suspect since the delay was not created for the
purpose of interrogating the accused while a duty to arraign
existed.
88
In essence then, necessary or permissible delay may be iden-
84. United States v. Cluchette, 465 F.2d 749 (9th Cir. 1972).
85. United States v. Collins, 462 F.2d 792 (2d Cir. 1972); see also
United States v. Kershner, 432 F.2d 1066, 1070 (5th Cir. 1970).
86. However, where the accused has been held in state detention with-
out being arraigned prior to federal custody and has made inculpatory ad-
missions either during such detention or immediately thereafter, the ques-
tion arises whether the state detention constitutes "unnecessary delay"
within the meaning of Rule 5 (a). The answer to this has been: absent col-
lusion between federal and local police which allows federal agents to uti-
lize the period of state detention both to avoid prompt arraignment and to
provide time for interrogation, Rule 5 (a) becomes applicable only from the
point of federal arrest. Therefore, confessions made during a period of state
detention are not barred per se from federal trial by the McNabb-Mallory
rule. United States v. Rollerson, 491 F.2d 1209, 1212 (5th Cir. 1974); United
States v. Fallon, 457 F.2d 15, 20 (10th Cir. 1972); United States v. Davis,
459 F.2d 167, 170 (6th Cir. 1972); United States v. Halbert, 436 F.2d 1226,
1229 (9th Cir. 1970); Grooms v. United States, 429 F.2d 839, 842-43 (8th Cir.
1970); United States v. Arcediano, 371 F. Supp. 457, 468 (D.N.J. 1974);
United States v. Singleton, 361 F. Supp. 346, 352 (E.D. Pa. 1973); see also
United States v. Romano, 482 F.2d 1183, 1190 (5th Cir. 1973); United States
v. Elliott, 435 F.2d 1013, 1015 (8th Cir. 1970).
87. Pettyjohn v. United States, 136 U.S. App. D.C. 69, 73, 419 F.2d 651,
655 (D.C. Cir. 1969). The court ruled that a valid waiver of Miranda rights
also constitutes a waiver of the Mallory right to be brought before a magis-
trate as quickly as possible. See also United States v. Poole, - U.S. App.
D.C. -, 495 F.2d 115 (D.C. Cir. 1974). But see United States v. Stage, 464
F.2d 1057, 1058 (9th Cir. 1972), which held that a waiver of Miranda rights
following a period of unnecessary delay would not retroactively validate
the illegal delay.
88. United States v. Grandi, 424 F.2d 399, 402 (2d Cir. 1970).
tified in four basic fact situations. First, are those delays in ar-
raignment caused by standard police processing procedures unre-
lated to extracting evidence from the accused. These procedures
include booking, fingerprinting, photographing, pedigree interviews,
transfers of custody and the like. Second, are those delays due
to the unavailability of a magistrate after the accused has been ar-
rested. Basically this situation results in some form of custody,
such as overnight detention, until the arrested party can be brought
for presentment. Third, are those lapses of time arising because
of circumstances beyond the control of the arresting officials.
These include delays caused by the necessities of travel or by com-
mon administrative errors. Finally, there are those periods arising
because of the voluntary actions of the arrested party which result
in a forestalling of arraignment. This last category is comprised of
those delays caused by the defendant's spontaneous and voluntary
admissions of guilt, his cooperation in police investigation, or even
his resistance of custody. Thus, all four of these categories lack
the essential factor present in "unnecessary delay" as construed
by Mallory v. United States,8 9 the intent of federal police to pro-
vide an opportunity to extract evidence from the accused rather
than to present him before a magistrate when such was still pos-
sible.30
What remains to :be answered is whether in view of the Mallory
decision interrogation may take place during permissible delay. Re-
cent decisions have indicated that interrogation during unavoidable
delay is not proscribed by the Mallory ruling and furthermore, that
a confession elicited during such a period will not be barred by oper-
ation of the McNabb-Mallory rule. In United States v. Collins,91
due to the necessities of booking and transfer procedures, the time
consumed by travel, and the unavailability of a magistrate at the
time the defendant was detained, the accused was not arraigned
until approximately a day after his arrest. At four stages during
custody the defendant was given his Miranda rights and asked
whether he could give information concerning the crime charged.
Each time the defendant refused to discuss the case, and interroga-
tion ceased. Just prior to ,being taken to the magistrate's office
by a federal attorney, the defendant was asked by the attorney
if he had a statement to make. At this point the defendant made a
full confession. After an elaborate analysis of the stages involved in
the accused's detention prior to arraignment the court found no un-
necessary delay or deliberate forestalling of presentment. Further-
more, in considering each attempt by federal authorities to question
the defendant, the court concluded that none of the interrogations
had been conducted without compliance with Miranda92 standards.
89. 354 U.S. 449 (1957).
90. See Bright v. United States, 274 F.2d 696, 697 (8th Cir. 1960).
91. 462 F.2d 792 (2d Cir. 1972).
92. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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From these observations it was concluded that the confession was
neither the product of unconstitutional interrogation nor unneces-
sary delay."3 By its holding the court thereby indicated that, within
a period of unavoidable delay, interrogation preceded by Miranda
warnings was not prohibited. Therefore, a confession obtained by
such interrogation would not be excluded from evidence by opera-
tion of the McNabb-Mallory rule.
II. MODIFICATION OF THE McNabb-Mallory RULE
A. Judicial Modification
Prior to congressional enactment of Title I194 of the Omnibus
Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, legislation intended to
supersede rules of evidence established by the Supreme Court,9 5
the federal courts had themselves displayed dissatisfaction with Mc-
Nabb-Mallory's96 exclusion of evidence obtained in violation of Rule
5(a) and sought grounds to circumvent strict application of the Mc-
Nabb-Mallory rule.97 This dissatisfaction arose because it was felt
that by the limiting the right of police to interrogate suspects, strict
application of the McNabb-Mallory rule would seriously hamper
proper law enforcement and criminal investigation. 9  A line of
cases in the Second Circuit went so far as to eventually establish
that limited interrogation of a suspect immediately after arrest did
not constitute "unnecessary delay" despite a present duty to bring
an arrested party before a magistrate. In United States v. Vita,99
the accused voluntarily submitted himself to the custody of federal
93. United States v. Collins, 462 F.2d 792, 795, 797 (2d Cir. 1972); cf.
United States v. Taylor, 374 F.2d 753, 757 (7th Cir. 1967); United States v.
Currie, 354 F.2d 163, 165 (2d Cir. 1965); United States v. Blocker, 354 F.
Supp. 1195, 1199 & n.18 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (magistrate unavailable following
arrest, therefore interrogation not prohibited by McNabb-Mallory); contra,
Spriggs v. United States, 118 U.S. App. D.C. 248, 253, 335 F.2d 283, 288 (D.C.
Cir. 1964).
94. Title II is currently codified in 18 U.S.C. §§ 3501, 3502 (1968).
95. See note 29 and accompanying text supra.
96. Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957); McNabb v. United
States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943).
97. Thus, because the fact situation in Mallory involved the intimida-
tion and prolonged questioning of the accused, some courts have attempted
to construe the Mallory exclusionary rule as applicable only when such
elements are present. See, e.g., United States v. Price, 345 F.2d 256, 261 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 949 (1965).
98. See United States v. Vita, 294 F.2d 524, 527-34 (2d Cir. 1961) for
one court's lengthy and annotated treatment of the Mallory rule in light of
the need to protect society from "lawbreakers."
99. 294 F.2d 524 (2d Cir. 1961); accord, Gray v. United States, 394 F.2d
96 (9th Cir. 1967); cf. Trilling v. United States, 104 U.S. App. D.C. 159, 260
F.2d 677 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
agents. He was then advised of his rights and interrogated. How-
ever, despite being held in custody the defendant was not placed un-
der formal arrest until the police had investigated the story given by
him during interrogation. The defendant gave a full confession fol-
lowing the formal arrest, but because a magistrate was not avail-
able, arraignment was not made until the next day. Reviewing
defendant Vita's subsequent conviction the court of appeals rejected
the defendant's argument that he had been improperly detained
without arraignment prior to his confession, stating that investiga-
tory interrogation prior to arrest did not constitute illegal deten-
tion.10 0 The court reasoned that the questioning did not constitute
an attempt to keep the defendant in custody until he confessed,
but rather was merely aimed at confirming the details of the ac-
cused's initial story. The appellate court also determined that no
"unnecessary delay" had occurred in as much as the interrogation
had been conducted with the defendant's cooperation, after advice
of the defendant's rights, and under circumstances not indicative
of arrest. In commenting on the applicability of the Mallory deci-
sion to detention outside arrest, the court stated:
We believe there are. . . circumstances which may warrant
a detention that is more than "brief"; that when needed
for investigation rather than mere repetitious interroga-
tion reasonable detention is permissible so long as certain
safeguards are observed. 1 1
The court went on to add that since the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure did not indicate a time period in which a suspect could
be interrogated, "investigatory interrogation . . . should be per-
mitted before the accused is taken to a committing magistrate.' 10 2
Subsequently, in United States v. Braverman'03 the language
of Vita was construed as sanctioning a short period of interrogation
immediately after arrest. In Braverman, although police question-
ing of the accused had been responsible for a delay in arraignment,
the court concluded that the delay was a "reasonable" one and
therefore, not violative of Rule 5(a) .104 The court arrived at this
conclusion by noting that the accused prior to interrogation had
been told his constitutional rights, the inculpatory statements had
been made voluntarily, and the interrogation had lasted only
twenty-nine minutes. The reasoning of the Braverman decision
was carried one step further in United States v. Crutcher.1 5 There
too the accused's voluntary responses to police questioning made
following arrest but prior to arraignment were held admissible at
100. United States v. Vita, 294 F.2d 524, 532 (2d Cir. 1961).
101. Id. at 533.
102. Id.
103. 376 F.2d 249 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 885 (1967).
104. Id. at 251.
105. 405 F.2d 239 (2d Cir. 1968); cf. O'Neal v. United States, 411 F.2d
131, 136 (5th Cir. 1969).
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trial despite the firm mandate of Rule 5 (a). Noting that Braver-
man had found interrogation of twenty-nine minutes to constitute
permissible delay, the court in Crutcher determined that an
eighteen minute period of questioning involved in the case likewise
should not be grounds for excluding the defendant's incriminatory
statements from evidence. 10
By concentrating on factors indicating both the voluntary,
though not spontaneous, nature of the defendant's admissions and
the lack of prolonged interrogation giving rise to those admissions,
Braverman and Crutcher had in effect found delay for interroga-
tion purposes warranted when there existed an absence of coercive
factors surrounding the confession. Nevertheless, such sanctioning
of delay had previously been specifically rejected by the Supreme
Court in its Upshaw 0 7 decision which had found that a thirty min-
ute interrogation following arrest did not justify a delay in arraign-
ment merely because no psychological coercion or prolonged ques-
tioning had occurred. 08 Thus, the Braverman and Crutcher hold-
ings had circumvented the McNabb-Mallory rule by using voluntar-
iness and length of interrogation as the criteria for determining ad-
missibility. By not excluding confessions obtained in deferment of
immediate arraignment these two decisions, and cases in the same
line, 10 9 represent judicial limitations on the strict application of the
exclusionary rule demanded by Upshaw. They also represent an
unwillingness on the part of certain federal courts to ensure un-
varying police compliance with Rule 5 (a)'s restriction on "unneces-
sary delay."
One reason for the the unwillingness of some federal courts
to strictly enforce Rule 5(a) has ibeen the feeling that the Mi-
randa"10 warning given by police prior to interrogation serves the
same function as the warnings the accused would receive from a
magistrate on arraignment. It thus has been argued that if part
of the purpose behind the McNabb-Mallory rule is to ensure that
an accused will not remain in police custody ignorant of his con-
stitutional rights, then once a Miranda warning has been given, this
106. Crutcher v. United States, 405 F.2d 239, 245 (2d Cir. 1969).
107. Urshaw v. United States, 335 U.S. 410 (1948).
108. Id. at 413. See note 61 and accompanying text supra.
109. E.g., United States v. Quarles, 387 F.2d 551, 555 (4th Cir. 1967);
Rogers v. United States, 330 F.2d 535, 538-39 (5th Cir. 1964); United States
v. Ladson, 294 F.2d 535, 538 (2d Cir. 1961); United States ex rel. Chennault
v. Smith, 366 F. Supp. 717, 724 (E.D.N.Y. 1973). Such cases have condoned
delays used to elicit "voluntary" evidence from an arrestee by stating these
delays are justifiable in the name of "reasonableness" or "flexibility."
110. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
purpose is thereby served and the necessity for ensuring strict com-
pliance with Rule 5 (a) loses its force.'1 ' However, this argument
ignores the admonishment given by the Miranda Court itself that
a warning by police of an accused's constitutional rights does not
mean therefore that the police are free to disregard their duties
under the rules of criminal procedure. 112 The words of the Miranda
decision would indicate that a police warning of constitutional
rights is no substitute for compliance with the mandate of arraign-
ment "without unnecessary delay."
B. Congressional Modification of the McNabb-MalZory Rule
A legislative modification of the exclusionary rule occurred in
.1968 with congressional passage of Title II of the Omnibus Crime
Control and Safe Streets Act.11  Title II, as codified in 18 U.S.C.
§ 3501 (1968),' 1 4 sets standards for the admissibility of confes-
111. O'Neal v. United States, 411 F.2d 131 (5th Cir. 1969).
112. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 463 n.32 (1966).
113. On two previous occasions, each following the Supreme Court's
McNabb and Mallory rulings, Congress had unsuccessfully attempted to
pass bills modifying the Court's exclusionary rule. For an account of these
legislative efforts see 38 J. CriM. L. 136 (1947); Comment, Prearraignment
Interrogation and the McNabb-Mallory Miasma, 68 YALE L.J. 1003, 1028-
1030 (1959).
114. 18 U.S.C. § 3501 (1968) states in part:
(a) In any criminal prosecution brought by the United States
or by the District of Columbia, a confession . . . shall be admissible
in evidence if it is voluntarily given. Before such confession is re-
ceived in evidence, the trial judge shall, out of the presence of the
jury, determine any issue as to voluntariness. If the trial judge de-
termines that the confession was voluntarily made it shall be ad-
mitted in evidence and the trial judge shall permit the jury to hear
relevant evidence on the issue of voluntariness and shall instruct
the jury to give such weight to the confession as the jury feels it
deserves under all the circumstances.
(b) The trial judge in determining the issue of voluntariness
shall take into consideration all the circumstances surrounding the
giving of the confession, including (1) the time elapsing between
arrest and arraignment of the defendant making the confession, if
it was made after arrest and before arraignment, (2) whether such
defendant knew the nature of the offense with which he was
charged or of which he was suspected at the time of making the
confession, (3) whether or not such defendant was advised or knew
that he was not required to make any statement and that any such
statement could be used against him, (4) whether or not such de-
fendant had been advised prior to questioning of his right to the
assistance of counsel; and (5) whether or not such defendant was
without the assistance of counsel when questioned and when giving
such confession.
The presence or absence of any of the above-mentioned factors
to be taken into consideration by the judge need not be conclusive
on the issue of voluntariness of the confession.
(c) In any criminal prosecution by the United States or by the
District of Columbia, a confession made or given by a person who
is a defendant therein, while such person was under arrest or other
detention in the custody of any law-enforcement officer or law-en-
forcement agency, shall not be inadmissible solely because of delay
in bringing such person before a magistrate or other officer em-
powered to commit persons charged with offenses against the laws
of the United States or of the District of Columbia if such confes-
sion is found by the trial judge to have been made voluntarily and
if the weight to be given the confession is left to the jury and if
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sions. Section 3501 (a) (hereinafter referred to as section (a) ) es-
tablishes that before admission of a confession in evidence, judicial
determination of voluntariness shall be made at a hearing held sep-
arately from the presentations at trial.1 , Section 3501(b) (herein-
after referred to as section (ib) ) states that voluntariness is to be
determined by the circumstances surrounding the confession and
details five additional elements which the court may take into con-
sideration in determining voluntariness but leaves to the trial
judge's discretion the weight to be given to each of these factors.
In form section (b) resembles a "totality of the circumstances"
test" utilized by federal courts to determine if a confession was
not the product of the accused's free will. 117 However, the section
leaves to the consideration of the trial judge factors which had in
the past been held by the Supreme Court to constitute violations
of mandatory safeguards for the protection of the accused, one of
these factors being delay between arrest and arraignment.",8
Section 3501 (c) (hereinafter referred to as section (c) ) deals
primarily with the exclusionary effect of delay between arrest' 19
and pre-arraignment confession rather than delay between arrest
and arraignment; that is to say, it specifically deals with the
McNabb-Mallory situation. Section (c) presents three periods of
delay between arrest and confession for the trial judge to consider:
delays less than six hours, delays greater than six hours warranted
such confession was made or given by such person within six hours
immediately following his arrest or other detention: Provided,
That the time limitation contained in this subsection shall not apply
in any case in which the delay in bringing such person before such
magistrate or other officer beyond such six-hour period is found by
the trial judge to be reasonable considering the means of transpor-
tation and the distance to be traveled to the nearest available such
magistrate or other officer.
115. This section of the statute rarallels the Supreme Court decision in
Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964).
116. Rather than gauge involuntariness in terms of physical punishment
or abuse which overpowers the accused's will, the test considers both the
debilitating effect of pressures exerted prior to confession and the accused's
ability to resist. Such pressures include prlonged incommunicado deten-
tion, denial of counsel, "relay" interrogation, and denial of adequate food
or sleep. See Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 622 (1961); Fikes v.
Alabama, 352 U.S. 191, 197 (1957).
117. Reinke v. United States, 405 F.2d 228, 230 (9th Cir. 1968).
118. The safeguards, besides prompt arraignment, are those established
by the Supreme Court in Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964) and Mi-
randa v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) as guarantees of the fifth and sixth
amendments.
119. Section (c) speaks of "arrest or other detention." This is presum-
ably to cover situations in which the interrogated party, though not under
formal arrest, is restricted by the police to such a degree that the detention
constitutes a de facto arrest.
by the provision of section (c), and delays greater than six hours
not warranted by the provision. However, it should be noted that
since section (c) is not a rule of criminal procedure but a rule of
evidence, it does not change the duty of an arresting officer to obey
Rule 5 (a)'s requirement of arraignment without "unnecessary de-
lay.' 120 Instead, section (c) simply represents a formula for deter-
mining admissibility when delay does occur.
1. Analysis of Section (c)
At least two interpretations of section (c) are possible. Under
the first and more liberal interpretation to be discussed here it may
be reasoned that if voluntariness is first determined by the test
set forth in section (b), and if the only remaining grounds for
finding inadmissibility is delay 'between arrest and confession, then
under section (c) neither a delay of less than six hours nor a
delay of greater than six hours warranted by the provision would
cause a voluntary confession to be excluded. Thus, under section
(c) only a lapse of greater than six hours (not warranted by the sec-
tion's special provision) would lead to the determination that a vol-
untary confession shall be inadmissible in evidence. This interpre-
tation, therefore, provides both a set span of time when delay for
interrogation purposes is permissible' 2 1 and a limit of the time an
arresting officer may, in lieu of prompt arraignment, question a
party under custody. The section hence represents not a nullifi-
cation of the McNabb-Mallory rule, but merely a restriction on its
application.
A second and more restrictive interpretation of the function
of section (c) is possible if voluntariness is taken to be the sole
evidentiary standard governing the admissibility of confessions.
122
Such an interpretation would of course assume that the McNabb-
Mallory rule is no longer of binding consideration in the determina-
tion of admissibility. Hence, under this construction, delay between
arrest and arraignment would not be an element for separate evi-
dentiary consideration. Rather, it would be only one added fact
to be taken into account in the adjudication of voluntariness under
section (b). The function of section (c) would be to permit judicial
consideration of delay as the sole factor giving rise to involuntari-
120. See United States v. Keeble, 459 F.2d 757 (8th Cir. 1972).
121. A similar intent to provide a limited time period for police interro-
gation exists in the District of Columbia Crime Act of 1967. D.C. CODE
ANN. § 4-140(a) (1973). The District of Columbia statute states:
Any statement, admission, or confession made by an arrested party
within three hours following his arrest shall not be excluded from
evidence in the courts of the District of Columbia solely because
of delay in presentment.
122. United States v. Halbert, 436 F.2d 1226, 1234 (9th Cir. 1970). Here
the court felt that the language of section (a) of 18 U.S.C. § 3501 (1968)
indicated that voluntariness was to be the sole test of admissibility within




ness only if the period between arrest and confession were greater
than six hours and not justifiable under the terms of the provision.
Nevertheless, even if delay were the sole factor for the court's de-
termination of admissibility, because of the discretion granted the
court in section (b),123 a trial judge may not only consider delay
merely as it relates to voluntariness, but entirely discount the
presence of the delay if he chooses. 24 This construction thus as-
sumes voluntariness as the sole standard of admissibility and in
effect nullifies any application of the McNabb-Mallory rule within
the statute.
Nevertheless, the assumption that voluntariness is the sole
standard of admissibility within Title II and, therefore, the controll-
ing standard for section (c) leads to conclusions contrary to any
purpose for enacting a legislated rule of evidence controlling on
the courts. For the voluntariness assumption to hold true, the term
"inadmissible" in section (c) must mean the same as "involuntary."
Thus, by this construction the section would in substance read:
"a confession shall not be held involuntary solely because of delay
in bringing the arrested party before a magistrate if, etc. .. .
However, this reading adds nothing to the already existing body
of federal case law. This is apparent from the fact that in the past
federal courts have consistently rejected delay in arraignment as
sole grounds for finding involuntariness, and have done so on the
grounds that the issue of delay does not of itself give rise to con-
stitutional considerations pertaining to involuntariness. 125  Fur-
thermore, whenever a confession obtained during delay has been
judged involuntary and hence inadmissible, the court's decision has
been based on the presence of prejudicial factors within the delay
following arrest rather than merely on the fact of delay itself.' 26
Therefore, if involuntary and "inadmissible" are synonymous as
123. See note 114 and accompanying text supra.
124. Halbert v. United States, 436 F.2d 1126, 1234 (9th Cir. 1970).
125. Gallegos v. Nebraska, 342 U.S. 55, 63-64 (1951). It was held by
the Court that pre-arraignment delay does not of itself constitute a violation
of due process nor render involuntary a confession obtained in that period
of delay. But see United States v. Rollerson, 491 F.2d 1209, 1212 n.3 (5th
Cir. 1974).
126. Where a court has taken note of delay in its determination of
whether a confession has been obtained in violation of due process, it has
been what has occurred within the delay, e.g., prolonged incommunicado
detention and interrogation, denial of sleep or food, refusal of right to coun-
sel, rather than bare delay that has been the operative factor in the court's
,ruling of involuntariness. See, e.g., Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568
(1961); Reck v. Pate, 367 U.S. 433 (1961); Fikes v. Alabama, 352 U.S. 191
(1957); Johnson v. Pennsylvania, 340 U.S. 881 (1950); Ashcraft v. Tennes-
see, 322 U.S. 143 (1944); Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227 (1940).
the second interpretation of the statute would indicate, then sec-
tion (c) as so rephrased is simply a legislative reiteration of what
the federal courts have already established, i.e., that the presence
of delay alone may not lead to a conclusion of involuntariness.
When further considered, section (c) (as rephrased above in
terms of the voluntariness standard) presents a second incongruity.
This appears in the effect the word "if" in the rephrased portion
has on the interpretation of section (c). The conditional preposition
"if" allows the section to read: delay may not be sole grounds for
a finding of involuntariness only if a certain condition is met. Thus,
if the condition is not met, it is then implied that delay between
arrest and confession be sole grounds for a finding of involuntari-
ness. Even the courts in their formulations of admissibility stand-
ards have been unwilling to give such an effect to naked delay.127
If considered within the context of section (c), the assumption
that voluntariness is to be the single test of admissibility within
Title II gives rise to other anomalies. Once again, if "inadmissible"
is taken to mean "involuntary," section (c) would read: "a confes-
sion shall not be held involuntary solely because of delay in bring-
ing the arrested party before a magistrate if such confession is
found by the trial judge to have been made voluntarily, etc. .. ."
By the second interpretation discussed at the beginning of this anal-
ysis, the only necessity for considering delay is to determine the
issue of voluntariness. Yet, it would serve no purpose for the
trial judge to consider the factor of delay in these terms unless
delay alone may be determinative of voluntariness. But, as has
already been noted, delay absent coercive circumstances can-
not lead to such a determination.1 2 8 As section (c) further in-
dicates, since the confession has already been "found by the
trial judge to have been made voluntarily," then adjudication of
the presence of coercive circumstances must have been done before-
hand. Thus, once voluntariness has been found prior to considera-
tion of delay in section (c), such a consideration cannot have any
effect on the determination of admissibility since the sole require-
ment for admissibility, voluntariness, has already been met. There-
fore, section (c), as interpreted under the voluntariness stand-
ard for admissibility, mandates a purposeless consideration.
However, even if arguendo we assume that no determination
of voluntariness has been made by the trial judge before reaching
the question of delay under section (c) and also assume that naked
delay, absent the effect of surrounding influences, may give rise
to involuntariness, implementation of section (c) will still lead fo
incongruities. By the wording of the section, a delay of less than
six hours may not of itself give rise to a finding of involuntariness,
though a delay greater than six hours may lead to such a deter-
127. See notes 125 and 126 supra.
128. See note 126 supra.
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mination. But for this determintion to be made the court must
find at least some quality inherent in the delay that would tend
to induce a confession not the product of an accused's free will.
Absent consideration of coercive factors surrounding the delay be-
tween arrest and confession, the only thing left to deliberate is the
effect of the time element on voluntariness. (Such an abstract de-
liberation would nonetheless be fruitless, if not impossible, when re-
moved from the framework of circumstances in the case.) Howev-
er, even if it were possible to conclude that a mere lapse of time
without any other coercive factors or circumstances operating with-
in it may by itself render a confession involuntary and therefore in-
admissible, to say that only a time period greater than six hours
may lead to such a conclusion but that a period less than six hours
may not, is to establish a test of voluntariness that is absolutely ar-
bitrary and devoid of any true evaluation of what constitutes coer-
cion.
Thus, if a court were to consider the time element in delay
as sufficient in itself to lead to a finding of involuntariness, it could
not in good conscience judge only periods greater than six hours
and shut its eyes to anything shorter than that period. What may
be coercive about the longer time period may similarly be coercive
about the shorter. Application of section (c) in this manner can,
therefore, lead only to inequities. Nevertheless, even if under sec-
tion (c) it is intended that the court consider coercive influences
within the delay rather than bare delay itself, to hold that a court
may only consider those circumstances as they exist within a span
of more than six hours, and may not consider them if they exist
in any smaller period of time would lead to equally unconscionable
results.
It is submitted that the difficulties and potential inequities
created by construing section (c) in terms of the voluntariness
standard can be avoided if instead the McNabb-Mallory exclusion-
ary rule is made the standard of admissibility in the section. Fol-
lowing the order in which the sections are presented in the statute,
a trial judge thus would first decide under section (b) if the confes-
sion was voluntary. Once voluntariness was established, the judge
would then determine under section (c) if the confession was ob-
tained in a period not permitted by the section.120 If this is so,
the judge would then apply the McNabb-Mallory rule to the facts
of the case and exclude or include the confession accordingly. 130
129. See note 121 and accompanying text supra.
130. See note 121 and accompanying text supra. Thus, it would be de-
termined that if the confession was obtained in a period of delay greater
Thus, by utilizing the McNabb-Mallory rule rather than the
voluntariness test as the standard of admissibility under section
(c), the section becomes something more than a mere reiteration
of past judicial determinations regarding the relationship between
delay and voluntariness. In other words, the section would thereby
represent a fair and coherent statutory rule of evidence which
would restrict but not abolish application of the McNabb-Mallory
rule. However, it should be noted this is precisely the first inter-
pretation of section (c) stated earlier in this Comment. 3 1
It is clear, nevertheless, under either interpretation given the
section 3 2 that neither a period of six hours between arrest and
a voluntary confession, nor a period greater than six hours excepted
'by the proviso will constitute sole grounds for the suppression of
a confession from evidence. 13 It is also apparent that application
of the McNabb-Mallory rule has in the least been modified by 18
U.S.C. § 3501 (1968). 134 Whether this statutory modification goes
so far as to represent an abrogation of the court created exclusion-
ary rule depends upon the weight and meaning the federal courts
give the statutory rule of evidence in light of past adherence to
McNabb-Mallory doctrine.
2. Section (c) in the Courts
Where two judicial rules of evidence concern the admissibility
of the same type of evidence but do so on different grounds, a court
may simply rely on trend and precedent to determine which rule
must have primacy. A different situation arises however if one
evidentiary rule has been set forth by the highest court of the juris-
diction and the other by a legislative enactment which does not ex-
plicitly override the court created rule. Without subsequent guid-
ance from the high court, accommodation of the two standards will
naturally be left to the judicial interpretation of the lower courts.
Furthermore, though an accommodation may nevertheless be
achieved by applying both rules to arrive at the same conclusion, it
is the policy concerning admissibility which the lower court has
established by its deliberation, not the holding of the case, that
ultimately determines the relationship between the rules. Such is
the current situation in the federal courts with regard to the conflict
between the McNabb-Mallory rule and section (c).
Both McNabb-Mallory and the statutory rule deal with admis-
than six hours created for the purpose of extracting evidence from the ar-
restee prior to arraignment, then the confession must be excluded. By im-
plication such an application of McNabb-Mallory within section (c) allows
a six hour period of delay during which a voluntary confession may be elic-
ited and not excluded from evidence.
131. See note 121 and accompanying text supra.
132. See note 121 supra.
133. See United States v. McCormick, 468 F.2d 68, 74 (10th Cir. 1972).
134. United States v. Davis, 459 F.2d 167, 170 (2d Cir. 1972).
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sibility of confessions in terms of prearraignment delay. But be-
cause McNabb-Mallory is concerned with the cause of the delay, 35
while section (c) speaks in terms of the length of the delay, 136 the
incongruity between the rules is apparent. Nonetheless, application
of both rules of admissibility to the same evidence in a case is still
possible.
Cases which have considered both rules have generally used a
two step procedure. In most instances once a confession has been
found admissible under McNabb-Mallory, courts have found means
of also admitting it under the statute.1 31 The reasons for this ac-
comodation of section (c) with McNabb-Mallory are twofold. First,
the situations which might give rise to serious consideration of
exclusion under section (c) are fewer in number since the section
operates only when the delay between arrest and confssion is
greater than six hours and not excepted by the proviso. 38 Hence,
admissibility under section (c) of the statute is at issue only in a
limited number of situations. Second, even when the period
of delay is not permitted by section (c), certain decisions have
nevertheless concluded that once voluntariness is established under
section (b), admissibility may be found without further need for
consideration under the statute despite the length of the delay. 3 9
Thus, it is apparent from those cases employing both rules, once
admissibility is determined to exist under both any need to deter-
mine priority between the standards no longer exists. However,
despite the ability of some courts to employ both the McNabb-
Mallory rule and the statute to find a confession admissible, it
remains in issue whether McNabb-Mallory in light of 18 U.S.C. §
3501 retains its efficacy as a means of enforcing Rule 5(a)'s man-
date of arraignment without "unnecessary delay."'
40
The most direct procedure used to determine admissibility un-
der both McNabb-Mallory and section (c) was employed by the
court in Pettyjohn v. United States."1 There it was held that since
135. See note 68 and accompanying text supra.
136. See note 120 and accompanying text supra.
137. See note 145 and accompanying text infra.
138. See United States v. McCormick, 468 F.2d 68, 74 (10th Cir. 1972).
139. United States v. Halbert, 436 F.2d 1226, 1237 (9th Cir. 1970); see
also United States v. Kriz, 301 F. Supp. 1329, 1332 & n.2 (D. Minn. 1969).
The district court in Kriz, after finding no violation of the prompt arraign-
ment statute that would warrant exclusion of the defendant's inculpatory
admissions, also noted that since the defendant's statement had been volun-
tary it was also within the requirements of 18 U.S.C. § 3501(c) (1968).
140. See note 22 and accompanying text supra.
141. 136 U.S. App. D.C. 69, 419 F.2d 651 (D.C. Cir. 1969). In Pettyjohn
the accused entered a police station and said he wished to confess to the
the Mallory standards had not been violated in obtaining the con-
fession involved, consideration of admissibility under section (c)
was unnecessary. 142 However, an opposite approach was taken in
United States v. Jones14 3 in which there was a clear indication that
federal agents had intentionally delayed arraignment in order to
provide opportunity to interrogate the defendant. Despite the de-
fendant's contention that his confession had been obtained in direct
violation of Mallory standards, the Jones court chose to hold that
since the confession had been obtained within six hours after ar-
rest, it was admissible under section (c) notwithstanding the Mal-
lory rule.1
4 4
Between the extremes represented by the Pettyjohn and Jones
rulings are those cases which have held the defendant's inculpa-
tory statements admissible under both McNabb-Mallory and section
(c). Thus, where an incriminating admission was not made during
a period of delay proscribed by McNabb-Mallory and the lapse of
time between arrest and confession was less than six hours, these
decisions have therefore found the confession in question admissible
under both rules.145 A similar result has been reached where the
delay has been greater than six hours, but was found to be within
the restrictions set by both Mallory and the proviso of section
(c). 46 Hence, ,because in such cases the delay involved was not
one in violation of section (c), there was no necessity for the courts
to evaluate the ramifications that would result if a delay were per-
missible for purposes of the Mallory rule but not permitted under
application of section (c). Such a possibility would require either
reconciliation of the two rules of evidence or identification of an-
other basis for admissibility within the statute. Though one case
147
has recognized that, in the least, section (c) was not intended to
broaden the grounds for exclusion beyond the scope already estab-
lished by McNabb-Mallory, where the courts have been able to find
murder of his lover. The accused was then given his Miranda rights and
asked if he wished to elaborate on his statement. After giving the details
of the crime the defendant was then incarcerated and arraigned the next
morning. The appellate court held that the delay in arraignment following
the spontaneous confession would not vitiate an otherwise valid confession.
Id. at 73, 419 F.2d at 656.
142. Id. at 73 n.l, 419 F.2d at 656 n.11.
143. 352 F. Supp. 369 (S.D. Ga. 1972).
144. Id. at 382.
145. United States v. Clutchette, 465 F.2d 749, 754 (9th Cir. 1972);
United States v. Kershner, 432 F.2d 1066, 1070 (5th Cir. 1970); United States
v. Young, 355 F. Supp. 103, 110 (E.D. Pa. 1973); United States v. Blocker,
354 F. Supp. 1195, 1199 n.17 (D.D.C. 1973); see United States v. Davis, 459
F.2d 167, 169-70 (6th Cir. 1972).
146. United States v. Marrero, 450 F.2d 373, 376 (2d Cir. 1971). Tn find-
ing the defendant's confession admissible under both Mallory and the statu-
tory rule, the court emphasized that the proviso of 18 U.S.C. § 3501 (c) was
not limited to permitting delays caused merely by travel, but could also in-
clude such reasons for delay as would be allowable under the McNabb-
Mallory rule, e.g., delays caused by the unavailability of a magistrate.
147. Grooms v. United States, 429 F.2d 839, 843 (8th Cir. 1970).
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that the delay involved was not beyond the strictures of section
(c), McNabb-Mallory and the statute have been applied compat-
ibly.
148
Yet, when the period of delay in a fact situation has exceeded
six hours and has not been excepted by the wording of the proviso
of section (c), the courts in attempting to apply the statutory rule
have had to decide if a confession extracted in that period, though
admissible under Mallory, was nonetheless automatically excluded
by operation of section (c). But to arrive at such a conclusion, at
least one court recognized, would be to "expand the protection of
potential criminal defendants beyond the scope established by the
McNabb-Mallory cases."'149 Though the aforementioned conclusion
might well be avoided by inferring that section (c), as a limitation
of the McNabb-Mallory rule, directs only that a period not so ex-
cepted by the section be then adjudicated within considerations of
the McNabb-Mallory doctrine, 1 0 the majority of the courts apply-
ing section (c) have not chosen this construction.' 5' Thus, in order
to avoid ruling that section (c) mandated automatic exclusion of
confessions obtained after a lapse of six hours not allowed under
the provision of the section, these courts have adopted voluntariness
as the ultimate test of admissibility of such evidence.
Two considerations have in the past been employed to justify
adoption of voluntariness as the sole standard of admissibility un-
der the statutory rule. The first has been the legislative history
of 18 U.S.C. § 3501 (1968), which has been construed as indicating
both Congress' dissatisafction with McNabb-Mallory's exclusion of
otherwise admissible voluntary confessions and its desire to return
to the "traditional" test of voluntariness as the sole standard of
admissibility. 15 2 The second consideration leading to the applica-
148. See cases cited at note 145 supra.
149. United States v. Marrero, 450 F.2d 373, 378 (2d Cir. 1971).
150. Only two courts dealing with 18 U.S.C. § 3501(c) have given any
effect to this interoretaion. In United States v. Robinson, 142 U.S. App. D.C.
43, 439 F.2d 553 (D.C. Cir. 1970) the court stated that the statutory rule did
not nullify McNabb-Mallory as a rule of evidence but only restricted its ap-
plication "in certain circumstances" not then before the court. Id. at 54-
55, 439 F.2d at 564-65. The court in United States v. Stage, 464 F.2d 1057
(9th Cir. 1972) found that a confession obtained in violation of the period
allowed by section (c) was also violative of the McNabb-Mallory rule.
151. See cases cited at note 157 infra.
152. See, e.g., United States v. Halbert, 436 F.2d 1226, 1234-36 (9th Cir.
1970) which arrived at its particular interpretation of the statute by relying
upon a synopsis of congressional opinion regarding the intent and effect of
18 U.S.C. § 3501 (1968). See generally Comment, Title II of the Omnibus
Crime Bill: A Study of the Interaction of Law and Politics, 48 NEB. L. REV.
193 (1968). For the spectrum of senatorial opinion concerning the intent
of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Street Act of 1968 see S. REP. No.
tion of the voluntariness standard to section (c) has been the very
wording of the first two sections in the statute. Section (a) 151
has been construed as meaning that only voluntariness shall control
the court's determination of admissibility,'5 4 and section (b)' 5 5 has
been construed as confining delay to the status of merely one
element within the "totality of the circumstances" test of sec-
tion (b). 156 The conclusion drawn from these considerations has
been that section (c) does not automatically exclude voluntary con-
fessions obtained within a period of delay not excepted by the sec-
tion; rather, delay itself should be merely another factor to be
considered in determining the voluntariness of the confession.15
By this interpretation, only when voluntariness is the matter ac-
tually in question does delay become a factor for consideration. 5 8
Although one federal court of appeals has remanded a case for the
trial court's failure to consider the effect of a twenty-hour delay
upon a confession which the lower court had judged voluntary,159
the balance of the appellate courts have not given such critical im-
portance to section (c) determination if the confession has already
been adjudged voluntary by the lower court. Thus, acceptance of
the voluntariness standard by courts applying section (c) has led to
the net result that once the confession has been ruled voluntarily
given, the accused's invocation of section (c) to allege impermissible
delay has not prevented the appellate court from either rul-
ing the confession admissible or affirming the defendant's convic-
tion based on that confession.160
1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., as contained in 1968 U.S. Code Cong. & Adm.
News 2112-2309.
153. See note 114 supra.
154. United States v. Halbert, 436 F.2d 1226, 1232-36 (9th Cir. 1970).
155. See note 114 supra.
156. United States v. Halbert, 436 F.2d 1226, 1232-36 (9th Cir. 1970).
157. Gov't of Virgin Islands v. Gereau, 502 F.2d 914, 924 (3rd Cir.
1974); United States v. McCormick, 468 F.2d 68, 75 (10th Cir. 1972);
United States v. Johnson, 467 F.2d 630, 636-37 (2d Cir. 1972); United States
v. Collins, 462 F.2d 792, 796 (2d Cir. 1972); United States v. Keeble, 459 F.2d
757, 761 (8th Cir. 1972); United States v. Fallon, 457 F.2d 15, 20-21 (10th
Cir. 1972); United States v. Johnson, 455 F.2d 311, 315 (5th Cir. 1972);
United States v. Hathorn, 451 F.2d 1337, 1341 (5th Cir. 1971); United States
v. Halbert, 436 F.2d 1226, 1233-34 (9th Cir. 1970).
158. See United States v. Hathorn, 451 F.2d 1337 (5th Cir. 1971).
159. United States v. Keeble, 459 F.2d 757, 761 (8th Cir. 1972). On re-
mand, though the trial court found the lapse of time between arrest and
confession constituted unreasonable delay, it held that such a finding was
not conclusive on the issue of admissibility, and hence decided the confes-
sion was uncoerced. The trial court, therefore, reaffirmed its original find-
ing of voluntariness. The appellate court on subsequent rehearing sus-
tained the defendant's conviction. Id. at 762. It is apparent that despite
the appellate court's supposition that length of delay of itself could have
an effect on the voluntariness of a confession, in point of fact, as the trial
court's ruling indicates, delay absent coercive circumstances is not determi-
native on the issue of voluntariness. See note 126 supra.
160. See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 467 F.2d 630, 637 (2d Cir. 1972);
United States v. Halbert, 436 F.2d 1226, 1237 (9th Cir. 1970).
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Hence, because voluntariness has been accepted as the principal
measure of admissibility, judicial review of impermissible delay un-
der section (c) has been transformed in recent decisions into a pro
forma procedure. It is further to be noted that despite any utiliza-
tion of McNabb-Mallory by federal courts since the passage of Title
II, the majority of these courts have nonetheless chosen to proceed
under the statute and base their final determination of the re-
lationship between delay and admissibility upon the voluntariness
of the confession. Therefore, notwithstanding mere doubts as to
McNabb-Mallory's "present viability"''1 and "applicability in light
of 18 U.S.C. § 3501,11162 or failure to explicitly nullify the rule, 63
the courts have effectively relegated McNabb-Mallory to the role
of nugatory standard of admissibility.
Evident in the current treatment of McNabb-Mallory in the
courts is a continuing judicial trend away from strict application
of an exclusionary rule created to enforce Rule 5(a)'s mandate of
arraignment "without unnecessary delay." With the vitiation of
McNabb-Mallory in the federal courts and the emergence of a
policy favoring voluntariness as the sole requisite of admissibility,
the current enforcement of Rule 5 (a) in the courts thus has become
dependent upon the voluntariness of the evidence obtained during
delay rather than on the manner in which the procedural rule has
been complied with. Though the courts operating under Title IH
have looked for "reasonable" compliance'6 4 with Rule 5(a), there
is no indication that unreasonable compliance will cause exclusion
of evidence elicited during delay unless the element of involuntari-
ness is present. 65
III. PENNSYLVANIA'S ADOPTION OF THE McNABB-MALLORY RuuE
At present Pennsylvania is the only state jurisdiction, 6 with
161. The one exception to this is the decision of United States v. Jones,
352 F. Supp. 369 (S.D. Ga. 1972) which, in dealing with a confession ob-
tained during pre-arraignment delay, specifically rejected McNabb-Mal-
lory considerations and instead applied the rule of section (c) of 18 U.S.C.
§ 3501 (1968).
162. United States v. Collins, 462 F.2d 792, 796 (2d Cir. 1972).
163. United States v. Johnson, 467 F.2d 630, 636 (2d Cir. 1972).
164. See United States v. McCormick, 468 F.2d 68 (10th Cir. 1972);
United States v. Collins, 462 F.2d 792, 796 (2d Cir. 1972). However, com-
pare with Gov't of Virgin Islands v. Gereau, 502 F.2d 914, 923 n.5 (3rd Cir.
1974).
165. See United States v. Keeble, 459 F.2d 757, 762 (8th Cir. 1972).
166. Only a small minority of jurisdictions have accepted some form of
the McNabb-Mallory rule. The few states which have done so have applied
the rule either in isolated decisions or with respect only to violations of a
specific statutory time limit on pre-arraignment detention. See, e.g., People
a substantial 'body of recent case law,18 7 making use of an exclusion-
ary rule modeled on the McNabb-Mallory0 8 doctrine. First articu-
lated by the state supreme court in Commonwealth v. Futch'69 the
Pennsylvania exclusionary rule was ruled applicable to all evidence
elicited by police through an "unnecessary delay" in arraignment
violative of Rule 118170 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Pro-
cedure. After a review of the McNabb-Mallory rule, the Futch
court stated:
[W]e think it appropriate to follow the federal approach
and exclude all evidence obtained during "unnecessary de-
lay" except that which . . has no reasonable relationship
to the delay whatsoever. 171 (emphasis added)
v. Deutschman, 23 Cal. App. 3d 559, 100 Cal. Rptr. 330 (1972) (48 hour sta-
tutory limit on delay, but accused must show prejudice caused by delay);
Vorhauer v. State, 59 Del. 35, 212 A.2d 886 (1965) (confession inadmissible
when elicited during period in excess of twenty-four hour limit on pre-
arraignment delay); People v. Walters, 8 Mich. App. 400, 154 N.W.2d 542
(1967) (unnecessary delay in arraignment sufficient grounds to exclude
evidence therein obtained).
167. See Commonwealth v. Showalter, - Pa. -, 328 A.2d 841 (1974);
Commonwealth v. Johnson, - Pa. -, 327 A.2d 618 (1974); Commonwealth
v. Wilson, - Pa. -, 327 A.2d 621 (1974); Commonwealth v. Terry, 457 Pa.
181, 321 A.2d 654 (1974); Commonwealth v. Cherry, 457 Pa. 201, 321 A.2d 611
(1974); Commonwealth v. Dreuitt, 457 Pa. 345, 321 A.2d 614 (1974); Com-
monwealth v. Williams, 455 Pa. 569, 319 A.2d 419 (1974); Commonwealth v.
Hancock, 455 Pa. 583, 317 A.2d 588 (1974); Commonwealth v. Dixon, 454 Pa.
444, 311 A.2d 613 (1973); Commonwealth v. Wayman, 454 Pa. 79, 309 A.2d
784 (1973); In re Geiger, 454 Pa. 51, 309 A.2d 559 (1973); Commonwealth v.
Peters, 453 Pa. 615, 306 A.2d 901 (1973); Commonwealth v. Dutton, 453 Pa.
547, 307 A.2d 238 (1973); Commonwealth v. Tingle, 451 Pa. 241, 301 A.2d
701 (1973); Commonwealth v. Jones, 449 Pa. 619, 294 A.2d 889 (1972); Com-
monwealth v. Futch, 447 Pa. 389, 290 A.2d 417 (1972); Commonwealth v.
Mathis, 227 Pa. Super. 464, 324 A.2d 407 (1974); Commonwealth v. Dick-
erson, 226 Pa. Super. 425, 313 A.2d 337 (1973); Commonwealth v. John-
son, 226 Pa. Super. 7, 8, 312 A.2d 418, 419 (1973) (dissenting opinion); Com-
monwealth v. Hunter, 226 Pa. Super. 11, 12, 312 A.2d 420 (1973) (dissenting
opinion).
168. Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957); McNabb v. United
States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943).
169. 447 Pa. 389, 290 A.2d 417 (1972).
170. PA. R. Ciam. P. 118 (effective May 1, 1970) (hereinafter referred
to as Rule 118):
When a defendant has been arrested without a warrant, he
shall be taken without unnecessary delay before the proper issuing
authority where a complaint shall be filed against him.
(a) If the complaint charges a court case, the defendant shall
be given an immediate preliminary arraignment.
(b) If the complaint charges a summary offense, the defendant
shall be given an immediate trial or upon his request, the defendant
shall be given the opportunity of posting security for his appear-
ance at trial on a date which shall be not less than three nor more
than ten days after his appareance, unless extended for cause
shown, or unless the issuing authority fixes an earlier date upon re-
quest of the defendant or his attorney with the consent of the police
officer.
Amended September 1, 1973, renumbered, and divided into PA. R. CraM. P.
62 (effective January 1, 1974) applicable to summary cases, and PA. CRIM.
P. 130 (effective January 1, 1974) applicable to court cases.
171. Commonwealth v. Futch, 447 Pa. 389, 394, 290 A.2d 417, 419 (1972).
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Like McNabb-Mallory the Futch rule was not constitutionally de-
rived17 2 but was based upon the supervisory powers of a supreme
court over the administration of justice in the courts of its jurisdic-
tion.173 Thus, the rule represents a recognition by the high court
of a need for a judicial deterrent to "possible adverse effects of
police conduct which deviates from the unequivocal language of
Rule 118."
1' 4
Prior to the Futch decision, failure by police to promptly bring
an arrested party before a magistrate was not ipso facto grounds
for suppression of a confession obtained during delay. Only if de-
lay were an element in assessing the voluntariness of the confession
within the "totality of the circumstances"17 5 was it then a matter
for judicial consideration. 176  In contrast to this approach, Futch
established delay as a separate grounds for exclusion apart from
any evaluation of the voluntariness of the confession.1 77  Hence,
delay in arraignment was made relevant to the determination of
admissibility.
Before January 1, 1965, the effective date of former Rule 116178
precursor of Rule 118, a defendant in Pennsylvania had no legal
right to preliminary arraignment or presentation before a magis-
trate following arrest. Consequently, the accused's first appearance
before a magistrate would instead have been at a preliminary hear-
ing to establish probable cause. 17 9 Nevertheless, though it had been
172. See note 13 and accompanying text supra.
173. Commonwealth v. Dutton, 453 Pa. 457, 552, 307 A.2d 238, 240
(1973).
174. Commonwealth v. Futch, 447 Pa. 389, 393, 290 A.2d 417, 420 (1972).
175. Commonwealth v. Simms, 455 Pa. 43, 315 A.2d 634 (1974). See
note 116 supra.
176. Commonwealth v. Koch, 446 Pa. 469, 474-75, 288 A.2d 791, 793
(1972); Commonwealth v. Moore, 444 Pa. 24, 29, 279 A.2d 146, 149 (1971);
Commonwealth ex rel. Butler, 429 Pa. 141, 153, 239 A.2d 426, 432-33 (1968);
see Commonwealth ex rel. Staino v. Cavell, 425 Pa. 365, 376, 228 A.2d 647,
653 (1967); Commonwealth v. Agoston, 364 Pa. 464, 479, 72 A.2d 575, 583
(1950).
177. Commonwealth v. Tingle, 451 Pa. 241, 250, 301 A.2d 701, 705 (1973).
178. PA. R. CRIM. P. 116 (effective January 1, 1965), as amended, PA.
R. CRIM. P. 118 (effective May 1, 1970).
179. Prior to the adoption of former Rule 116, the terms "preliminary
hearing" and "preliminary arraignment" were often used by the courts in-
terchangeably. However, under the current scheme of the Pennsylvania
Rules of Criminal Procedure, the function of the preliminary arraignment
is to ensure that the accused is judicially informed of the charge against
him and of his constitutional rights and is afforded opportunity to post bail
and to request a preliminary hearing. If not waived, a preliminary hearing
will then be set to determine probable cause. See PA. R. CRim. P. 119 (ef-
fective May 1, 1970) renumbered PA. R. CRI. P. 140 (effective January 1,
1974); PA. R. CRIM. P. 120 (effective May 1, 1970) renumbered PA. R. CRIvI.
P. 141 (effective January 1, 1974).
recognized that a defendant had a common law right in Pennsyl-
vania to a preliminary hearing before a magistrate prior to trial,8 0
a delay in presentment of the accused before a magistrate was not
considered to be a violation of due process.' 8 ' Furthermore, since
there was no specified time within which presentment had to be
made by police, unreasonable or illegal delay per se was not cog-
nizable by the courts.'8 2 Thus, prior to formulation of Rule 116,
for a court to take notice of the delay it was incumbent upon the
defendant to demonstrate that he had suffered prejudice from
the delay.' 83 A defendant therefore had to plead that the con-
fession obtained during delay was a product of duress, for without
voluntariness put in issue a confession could not be found inad-
missible because of mere delay in arraignment. 8 4 Yet, despite
the later adoption of former Rule 116 mandating arraignment
without "unnecessary delay," until the Futch decision delay re-
mained relevant to admissibility only when utilized as a com-
ponent of the "totality of the circumstances" test of voluntariness. 8 5
A. The Futch Decision
In Commonwealth v. Futch'8 6 the defendant was arrested with-
out warrant on suspicion of robbery and murder and was then kept
in custody for fifteen hours before being brought before a magis-
trate. During the first fourteen hours of detention the defendant
was interrogated but refused to admit any complicity in the al-
leged offense. Despite independent eyewitness identification of the
defendant at the scene of the crime, the police after completing
their interrogation placed the accused in a lineup but did not afford
him the right to counsel at the proceeding. As the Futch decision
later pointed out, denial of the right to counsel at an out of court
identification or a police lineup was a violation of the sixth amend-
ment guarantees enunciated in Wade v. United States.18 7 Further-
180. Commonwealth v. O'Brien, 181 Pa. Super. 382, 392, 124 A.2d 666,
672 (1956).
181. Commonwealth ex tel. Santiago v. Myers, 419 Pa. 326, 329, 214 A.2d
206, 208 (1965); Commonwealth er tel. Fox v. Maroney, 417 Pa. 308, 311,
207 A.2d 810, 811 (1965); Commonwealth v. Agoston, 364 Pa. 464, 479, 72
A.2d 575, 583 (1950).
182. Commonwealth ex tel. Whiting v. Rundle, 414 Pa. 17, 20, 198 A.2d
568, 570 (1964); Commonwealth v. Shupp, 365 Pa. 439, 445, 75 A.2d 587, 590
(1950).
183. Commonwealth ex tel. Whiting v. Rundle, 414 Pa. 17, 21, 198 A.2d
568, 570 (1964); Commonwealth ex Tel. Light v. Maroney, 413 Pa. 254, 257,
196 A.2d 659, 661 (1964); Commonwealth v. Graham, 408 Pa. 155, 164, 182
A.2d 727, 731 (1962).
184. Commonwealth ex tel. Fox v. Maroney, 417 Pa. 308, 314, 207 A.2d
810, 813 (1965); Commonwealth v. Agoston, 364 Pa. 464, 479-80, 72 A.2d 575,
583 (1950).
185. Commonwealth ex tel. Butler v. Rundle, 429 Pa. 141, 150-51, 239
A.2d 426, 433 (1968). Set note 116 supra.
186. 447 Pa. 389, 290 A.2d 417 (1972).
187. 388 U.S. 218 (1967). The Supreme Court ruled inadmissible any
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more, not only did police subject the defendant to lineup without
presence of counsel, but the lineup itself had been biased so as to
assure ready identification of the defendant. Only after witness
identification of the accused at the lineup proceeding did the police
then arraign the defendant. The delay in arraignment had oc-
curred despite the fact that a magistrate had been immediately
available throughout most of the period of defendant's detention.
On appeal from his conviction, the defendant asserted that the
lineup identifications were the product of an "unnecessary delay"
violative of Rule 118 and therefore improperly admitted into evi-
dence.'
88
From the facts in the case, the Futch court could have found
the evidence objected to inadmissible on constitutional grounds, but
like the court in McNabb v. United States,18 9 the Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court chose not to reach the constitutional issues present
in the case. Rather, it chose to base its findings on an exclusionary
rule of evidence pronounced by the court itself. As stated by the
court, the Futch rule excludes all evidence obtained during "unnec-
essary delay" proscribed by Rule 118190 except that evidence which
has no reasonable relationship to the delay whatsoever.9" Thus,
the rule was not limited to confessions, but included all evidence rea-
sonably related to the delay. By citing United States v. Mitchell
192
the court further indicated that it was aware that no "reason-
able relationship" could exist unless the delay preceded the evi-
dence obtained, and that evidence such as spontaneous confession
was therefore admissible. The Futch rule thus asserts two deter-
evidence obtained either through an extrajudicial police identification held
without benefit of counsel or through a suggestive, i.e., biased, lineup. Id.
at 227; see also Gilbert v. California, 338 U.S. 293 (1967); but see Kirby v.
Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972) (5-4 decision) which held that the Wade right
to counsel at lineup is limited to post-indictment lineups and may not be
extended to pre-indictment police identifications even where the susrect is
already under arrest; compare Commonwealth v. Ray, 455 Pa. 43, 315 A.2d
634 (1974); see generally Belsky, Criminal Procedure in Pennsylvania: The
Pre-Trial Issues in Four Parts, 78 DI. L. REV. 209, 262-81 (1973).
188. Though ruling the lineup identifications inadmissible, the supreme
court held that other incriminating evidence submitted at trial was suffi-
cient to sustain the conviction. Commonwealth v. Futch, 447 Pa. 389, 391,
290 A.2d 417, 418 (1972).
189. 318 U.S. 332 (1943).
190. In arriving at its formulation of the exclusionary rule, the court
also took note of the parallel between PA. R. CaM. P. 118 and FED. R. CaM.
P. 5 (a). Commonwealth v. Futch, 447 Pa. 389, 393, 290 A.2d 417, 419 (1972).
191. This reflects the interpretation given McNabb-Ma'llory by United
States v. Mitchell, 322 U.S. 65 (1944). See notes 46-56 and accompanying
text supra.
192. Id.'
minations that must be made: (1) whether there was "unnecessary
delay"; and (2) whether the "unnecessary delay" contributed to the
evidence extracted.
19
In the Futch case, the court first observed that in view of the
uncontested availability of a magistrate during the span of police
custody of the defendant, the detention constituted an "unnecessary
delay" in arraignment. It further noted that had the defendant
been promptly arraigned, he would have been assured of being in-
formed by a judicial authority of his right to counsel. The court
also commented that had counsel been present at the lineup, its
fairness would have been ensured. It therefore concluded that the
failure to promptly arraign contributed to the conducting of a line-
up that was both conducted prejudicially and without presence of
counsel.0 4 Because of the relationship between the delay and the
identifications obtained, the court ruled the evidence inadmis-
sible.195
By the language of its decision Futch limited allowable post-
arrest delay to either delay necessary for standard administrative
procedures or delay caused by the unavailability of a magistrate. 19
However, in its delineation of permissible delay the decision also
ruled that, in view of the defendant's initial refusal to make a con-
fession, interrogation after arrest did not constitute a warranted
delay of arraignment. 97 From the commentary in Futch it can be
readily inferred that where there is access to a committing magis-
trate, postarrest interrogation in lieu of arraignment constitutes "un-
necessary delay." This conclusion finds support in the decision of
Commonwealth v. Tingle,19 which held both that even waiver of
Miranda rights would not justify interrogation in deferment of im-
mediate presentment and, furthermore, that under the Futch rule a
confession elicited by such interrogation was inadmissible in evi-
dence.' 99
193. Commonwealth v. Wayman, 454 Pa. 79, 84, 309 A.2d 784, 787
(1973).
194. Commonwealth v. Futch, 447 Pa. 389, 395, 290 A.2d 417, 420 (1973).
195. Id.
196. A later supreme court decision, Commonwealth v. Tingle, 451 Pa.
241, 301 A.2d 701 (1973), observed that delay might also be permissible if
directed toward the possible exculpation of the accused. This conclusion
was also reached by Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957). How-
ever, the observation remains dictum in the Tingle case and to date is un-
supported in subsequent decisions of the court. In a recent holding the
court has nevertheless suggested that pre-arraignment delay would be
overlooked by the court if such delay were caused by the need to question
an arrested party, showing an fnitial willingness to cooperate, about the
location of co-suspects or eviddnce. Commonwealth v. Cherry, 457 Pa.
201, 205, 321 A.2d 611, 613 (1974) (dictum). Nonetheless, it is easy to see
how the above exception to the Futch rule could be readily abused.
197. Commonwealth v. Futch, 447 Pa. 389, 393, 290 A.2d 417, 419 (1972).
198. 451 Pa. 241, 301 A.2d 701 (1973); see also Commonwealth v. Han-
cock, 455 Pa. 583, 317 A.2d 588 (1974).




It is unclear from the Futch ruling itself what is sufficient to
establish a "reasonable relationship" between the unnecessary delay
in arraignment and the evidence so obtained. Though it has been
argued that the mere length of delay prior to a confession is the
determining factor in the Futch rule,20 0 other authority indicates
that this is clearly not the case. Thus, in Commonwealth v. Way-
man20 1 the defendant voluntarily surrendered to police before being
placed under arrest. After refusing to make an admission of guilt,
the accused was then detained and subjected to repeated interroga-
tion. Only after he had confessed at the end of twenty-four hours
of questioning was the accused immediately arraigned. Since the
lapse of time was obviously not the result of allowable standard
booking procedures, the court concluded that the delay in arraign-
ment was unnecessary. Furthermore, because the defendant had not
been arraigned until his confession had been extracted the court de-
termined that the confession was reasonbly related to the "unnec-
essary delay" and therefore inadmissible.
20 2
In Wayman it was not the length of time between arrest and
confession that established a "reasonable relationship" between the
evidence and the delay. Rather, the relationship was established
because delay had been manufactured by police to allow opportun-
ity to elicit a confession. Therefore, to argue that the length of
the delay itself should in any way be relevant to the issue at hand
is to ignore the fact that the length of time between arrest and
confession is determined merely by the power of the accused to
withstand interrogation or by his inability to satisfy his interroga-
tors. It is hence absurd to suggest that the strength of the relation-
ship between the evidence given and the "unnecessary delay" is de-
pendent upon the number of hours the accused can resist question-
ing. On the contrary, since the evidence follows the interrogation
during "unnecessary delay," and the delay in turn is created to
permit such questioning, once the interrogation is begun the rela-
tionship is established independent of how long the delay lasts. It
is the action of the police, therefore, that establishes the connection
between unnecessary delay and the evidence obtained.
In point of fact, the relationship that the Futch rules sets forth
is merely another form of the "but for" test;20 3 that is to say, but
200. Id. at 249, 301 A.2d at 705 (dissenting opinion).
201. 454 Pa. 79, 309 A.2d 784 (1973).
202. Id. at 85, 309 A.2d at 788.
203. See note 66 and accompanying text supra.
for unnecessary delay initiated by the police would the evidence
have been obtained during the lapse of time prior to arraignment.
The case of Commonwealth v. Tingle20 4 illustrates this reasoning.
In Tingle, despite the fact that after eight hours of interrogation
the accused admitted his guilt, the police delayed arraignment an-
other fifteen hours in order to secure a full written confession.
Though the state asserted that the confession was freely made and
therefore admissible per se, from the fact of the intentionally pro-
longed detention the court concluded that the evidence was reason-
ably related to the delay.205 Hence, it was not the length of the
detention nor the issue of duress, but the purpose for which the
delay was created that led to the conclusion that the evidence
could not have been obtained ".but for" the unnecessary delay.
20
C. Intent and Scope of the Futch Rule
In creating an exclusionary rule directed at evidence obtained
through violation of Rule 118, the aim of the Futch court was not
simply to deter illicit police conduct which might result in physical
or psychological abuse of the accused during prolonged pre-arraign-
ment detention. Instead, the chief concern of both the Futch ruling
and the line of decisions following it 20 7 has been to ensure that
a suspect, while under police arrest, would not be kept in ignorance
of either the charge against him or his legal and constitutional
rights because of failure to 'be promptly produced before an arraign-
ing magistrate as dictated by Rule 118. Though it has been argued
that police issuance of a Miranda warning to an arrested party ob-
viates the necessity for strict compliance with Rule 118, this conten-
tion specifically was rejected by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
in its decision in Commonwealth v. Tingle.2 0 8 The court in Tingle
noted that the very purpose of Rule 118 was to ensure that through
arraignment without "unnecessary delay" an accused is informed
of his rights by an officer of the court.20 9 Implied within this state-
ment is the recognition that police in their desire to secure evidence
from the accused may be perfunctory in assuring that the defendant
is completely aware of his rights and thereby subject the defendant
to objectionable police procedures. Certainly this was what had
happened in the Futch case. It was stressed in Commonwealth v.
204. 451 Pa. 241, 301 A.2d 701 (1973); see In re Geiger, 454 Pa. 51, 309
A.2d 559 (1973).
205. Commonwealth v. Tingle, 451 Pa. 241, 246-47, 301 A.2d 701, 703-04
(1973).
206. This evaluation is similar to the analysis of the McNabb-Mallory
rule made by the Court in Upshaw v. United States, 355 U.S. 410 (1948).
See notes 60-65 and accomn'anying text supra. See also Commonwealth v.
Williams, 455 Pa. 564, 574-75, 319 A.2d 419, 421 (1974). But see Common-
wealth v. Mathis, 227 Pa. Super. 464, 324 A.2d 407 (1974).
207. See note 167 supra.




Dixon,210 that the very purpose of Rule 118 is to place the accused,
an individual presumed innocent, before a "neutral authority" so
that he may know of his rights as quickly and as fully as possible.
Therefore, in its intent to secure compliance with Rule 118, the
Futch exclusionary rule is also a prophylactic rule of procedure,
and as such, directed toward protecting the rights of an individual
in a criminal proceeding.
211
Subsequent decisions2 12 have extended both the application and
the scope of the Futch rule. Thus, it has been indicated when the
issue of "unnecessary delay" is raised by the defendant, the burden
of proof is placed on the prosecution to demonstrate a necessity
for the delay unrelated to the purpose of eliciting evidence from
the accused during detention.218 Further, it has been shown that
the defendant need not plead and prove actual prejudice from the
delay for the evidence to be held inadmissible. It is sufficient that
the court on its own findings merely conclude that the evidence
objected to was reasonably related to the unnecessary delay.
214 It
has also been held that the Futch exclusionary rule may be applied
retroactively to violations of former Rule 116, the predecessor of
Rule 118; 215 this would extend the application of the exclusionary
rule to arrests made on or after January 1, 1965, the effective date
of old Rule 116.216 Furthermore, the Futch decision has also been
held applicable to juvenile arrest even though such arrests are not
specifically covered by Rule 118.217 It has also been suggested that
since the "fundamental purpose of preliminary arraignment is ...
to guarantee a citizen the same rights he is entitled to under the
Pennsylvania Constitution," 218 i.e., the right to know the charge
against him and the right to bail, Rule 118 in mandating prompt
arraignment also attains constitutional dimensions.219 It might fur-
ther be concluded that the Futch rule by seeking to ensure enforce-
ment of Rule 118 shares in these dimensions.
210. 454 Pa. 444, 446, 311 A.2d 613, 614 (1973).
211. See Commonwealth v. Williams, 454 Pa. 368, 372, 312 A.2d 597, 600
(1973).
212. See note 167 supra.
213. See Commonwealth v. Wayman, 454 Pa. 79, 84-85, 309 A.2d 784, 787
(1973).
214. See Commonwealth v. Dutton, 453 Pa. 547, 550-51, 307 A.2d 238, 240
(1973).
215. See note 170 supra.
216. Id. at 551-52, 307 A.2d at 240; see also Commonwealth v. Tingle,
451 Pa. 241, 301 A.2d 701 (1973).
217. See In re Geiger, 454 Pa. 51, 309 A.2d 539 (1973).
218. Commonwealth v. Dixon, 454 Pa. 444, 446, 311 A.2d 613, 614 (1973).
219. Id. at 448-49, 311 A.2d at 615.
IV. SUbMIARY AND CONCLUSION
The function of the McNabb-Mallory rule is to exclude from
criminal trial confessions obtained during a period of "unnecessary
delay" between arrest and arraignment. 2 0 The rule was intended
by the Supreme Court to ensure that an arrested party would not
be detained and interrogated while prompt arraignment before a
federal magistrate was still possible. 221 The rule was not created
as a means of excluding involuntary confessions from evidence.
222
Other evidentiary standards perform this function.223 Rather, Mc-
Nabb-Mallory's purpose is to provide an exclusionary consequence
to "unnecessary delay" in arraignment and to thus assure that an
accused would not remain long in police custody without being judi-
cially warned of his legal and constitutional rights.
2 4
While McNabb v. United States22 5 set down the rough dimen-
sions of the exclusionary rule, and the Upshaw22 6 decision distin-
guished its application from determinations to be made under the
voluntariness standard, the ruling of the Supreme Court in Mal-
lory227 further defined the rule's purpose by relating it to enforce-
ment of Rule 5 (a)'s command of arraignment without "unnecessary
delay." 228 However, despite the exclusionary rule's affirmation by
the Supreme Court in Mallory and Upshaw, the McNabb-Mallory
rule in the past has not been strictly followed by some federal
courts. 229 Courts deviating from strict application have done so
by making exercise of the rule dependent upon two factors: (1)
the length of the delay; and (2) involuntariness of the confession
in question, standards though now cloaked under the amorphous
term "reasonableness", nevertheless alien to the original function
of the rule. 210  More recently, the scope of McNabb-Mallory has
been further restricted by congressional adoption of 18 U.S.C. § 3501
(c) 21 1 governing the admissibility of confessions obtained prior to
arraignment.23 2 Though section (c) is both plagued with inconsis-
tencies and susceptible to a variety of interpretations, 23  the ma-
jority of federal courts applying the statute have construed it as
both mandating that voluntariness be the principal measure of ad-
220. See notes 12-15 and accompanying text supra.
221. See notes 34-43 and accompanying text supra.
222. See notes 60-63 and accompanying text supra.
223. See notes 1-11 and accompanying text supra.
224. See notes 68-80 and accompanying text supra.
225. 318 U.S. 332 (1943).
226. Upshaw v. United States, 335 U.S. 410 (1948).
227. Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957).
228. See note 70 supra.
229. See notes 94-112 supra.
230. Id.
231. See note 114 supra.
232. See notes 113-120 and accompanying text supra.
233. See notes 121-129 and accompanying text supra.
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missibility and significantly restricting the scope of McNabb-Mal-
lory.
234
Quite obviously the gradual abandonment of the McNabb-Mal-
lory rule in favor of the voluntariness standard has meant that
strict police compliance with the mandate of Rule 5 (a) is no longer
assured by the supervision of the federal courts. Also apparent
is the subversion of the McNabb Court's desire that a person under
arrest be neither subjected to the potential for abuse inherent in
custodial interrogation nor kept in incommunicado detention with-
out being judicially warned of all relevant rights. As a conse-
quence of the erosion of both the evidentiary standard represented
by McNabb-Mallory and the strict judicial enforcement of a defend-
ant's right to prompt arraignment, an arrested party must now de-
pend upon the police themselves to see that he is not prejudiced
by any failure to be properly arraigned. However, the reliability
of such a procedure is questionable considering the varying inter-
ests of the parties involved.
Contrary to the trend followed in federal courts the Pennsyl-
vania Supreme Court has shown that it has not become unaware
of the need to check the potential for police abuse of authority over
an arrested party and has recently adopted a McNabb-Mallory type
exclusionary rule.23 5 Nevertheless, unless this rule is firmly de-
fined and strictly applied it cannot become binding precedent for
the trial courts. Without such precedent, it is submitted, the rule
will be eroded in force until like McNabb-Mallory its application
becomes almost discretionary. If such a result occurs, enforcement
of prompt arraignment in the courts will become subordinated on
the trial level to determinations of voluntariness. However, if the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court clearly maintains that the absolute
compliance of police with judicially mandated arraignment proce-
dure is desired, the exclusionary rule will not lose its effect in the
lower courts as a means of enforcing such compliance.
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